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COMMENTS

SCALING WALLER: HOW COURTS HAVE ERODED THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT PUBLIC TRIAL RIGHT
ABSTRACT
American courts and legal commentators have long praised the Sixth
Amendment public trial right, but courts often lack the willingness to enforce
it. Although the Supreme Court has consistently held that violations of the
public trial right belong to an exceedingly small class of constitutional errors
requiring reversal, appellate courts persist in upholding improper courtroom
closures even when the record shows that courts below have violated the
applicable constitutional standard. When criminal trials are fatally fouled by
structural, constitutional error of this kind, the reluctance of appellate courts
to reverse is damaging in two ways—it encourages repetition of the same
mistake, and it denigrates core values of individual rights that underlie our
system of justice. This Comment argues for corrective action by explaining the
rules governing courtroom closure, highlighting the errors often made by trial
and appellate courts, and detailing the legal basis for more rigorous
enforcement of the public trial right.
Waller v. Georgia, decided in 1984, is perhaps the Supreme Court’s most
definitive pronouncement on the scope of the Sixth Amendment public trial
guarantee. This Comment explains the background and significance of Waller,
details the test it requires before a courtroom can be closed, and identifies
specific shortcomings in appellate review that undermine the public trial right.
In light of this assessment, appellate courts should: (1) refrain from applying
harmless error analysis to violations of the public trial right; (2) regularly
review alleged violations of Waller for plain error; (3) require application of
the Waller test in all cases of courtroom closure—even if pursuant to state law;
(4) refrain from using post hoc findings to justify closure; (5) reject the
argument that “partial” closure of the courtroom absolves courts of the
obligation to fully comply with Waller; and (6) recognize that even when
courtrooms are closed to protect child victims of sexual abuse, the procedural
rules of Waller still apply. Courts may not look past constitutional errors
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simply because state laws authorizing closure were drafted to protect victims,
not defendants; such errors still require reversal, even in the absence of a
well-preserved objection. Although the Court recently turned its attention to
the public trial right in Presley v. Georgia, the above issues remain
unaddressed.
INTRODUCTION
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial . . . .
—United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment1
“The harmless error rule is no way to gauge the great, though
intangible, societal loss that flows” from closing courthouse doors.
—Waller v. Georgia2

American courts and legal commentators have long praised the Sixth
Amendment public trial guarantee,3 but trial judges and appellate courts are
often unwilling to enforce this fundamental right. Although the Supreme
Court has consistently held that violation of the public trial right belongs to an
exceedingly small class of constitutional errors requiring reversal,4 state and
federal appellate courts persist in upholding improper courtroom closures.
When a criminal trial is fatally fouled by a courtroom closure that amounts to
structural, constitutional error of this kind, an appellate court’s refusal to
reverse fails to deter trial courts from repeating the same mistake and
undermines the core values of individual rights central to our system of
justice.5 This Comment argues for corrective action by explaining the rules
governing courtroom closure, highlighting the errors made by trial and
appellate courts, and detailing the legal basis for more rigorous enforcement of
the public trial right. The following anecdote illustrates the range of issues
involved.
1 Throughout this Comment the terms “public trial right” and “public trial guarantee” are used
interchangeably.
2 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (quoting People v. Jones, 391 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (N.Y. 1979)).
3 See discussion infra Part I.A–B (tracing the historical developments of, and justification for, the public
trial guarantee).
4 See discussion infra Part II.A (exploring the reasoning of Waller and its framework for securing the
right to a public trial against court errors).
5 See Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be
Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1194–99 (1995) (arguing that inadequate judicial regard for individual
rights erodes the sphere of personal liberty that distinctly undergirds the American criminal justice system).
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After six years of unrelenting sexual abuse by her stepfather, David Wayne
Craven’s eleven-year-old stepdaughter confided in family members, who
contacted the police.6 Prosecutors charged Craven with aggravated sodomy
and child molestation; he pleaded not guilty and insisted on a trial.7
Immediately before the young victim testified, the trial judge cleared the
courtroom of all but the parties, the lawyers, and courtroom personnel.8 Citing
Georgia law, which requires courtroom closure during the testimony of any
person under the age of sixteen regarding a criminal sex offense,9 the judge
also removed the defendant’s family, even though the statute required that they
be allowed to remain.10 After recognizing his error, the judge offered to have
the victim repeat her testimony the next day with Craven’s family present.11
Craven’s attorney declined, noting that “having the child testify twice would
unduly emphasize [her] testimony.”12 Craven was convicted of aggravated
sodomy and aggravated child molestation and sentenced to twenty-five years
in prison.13
On appeal, Craven claimed that the closure violated both state law and his
federal constitutional right to a public trial.14 Citing Waller v. Georgia,15
perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court’s most definitive pronouncement on the scope
of the Sixth Amendment public trial guarantee,16 Craven argued that because
violation of the public trial right constitutes “structural error,” he was not
required to show how the mistake affected the outcome of the trial to overturn
the verdict.17 Waller establishes clear guidelines for courtroom closure:
[(1)] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [(2)] the closure
must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [(3)] the
trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the
6

Craven v. State, 664 S.E.2d 921, 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied (Oct. 27, 2008).
Id. at 922.
8 Id. at 923.
9 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-54 (2009).
10 Id.; see also Craven, 664 S.E.2d at 924 (“As to the claim of a statutory violation, the trial court erred in
removing Craven’s immediate family from the courtroom while the victim testified.”).
11 Craven, 664 S.E.2d at 924.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 922.
14 Id. at 923.
15 467 U.S. 39 (1984); see also Logan Munroe Chandler, Sixth Amendment—Public Trial Guarantee
Applies to Pretrial Suppression Hearings, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 802 (1984) (discussing in detail the
four-part procedural and protective framework of Waller).
16 Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001).
17 Craven, 664 S.E.2d at 923–24; see also infra note 190 and accompanying text.
7
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hearing, and [(4) the trial court] must make findings adequate to
18
support the closure.

Despite these rules, the trial court in Craven’s case held no hearing prior to
closing the courtroom, made no findings of fact related to the closure, and did
not explore less restrictive alternatives to closing the courtroom.19 The
prosecution also neglected to advance an overriding interest likely to be
harmed absent closure. However, none of this troubled the Georgia Court of
Appeals, which accepted the trial court’s observation that the state mandatory
trial closure statute was “based upon a legislative determination that there is a
compelling state interest in protecting children when they are testifying
concerning a sex offense.”20 For the court of appeals, then, this presumably
functioned as a proxy for Waller’s requirement that the trial court find an
“overriding interest” justifying the closure. Moreover, although appellate
courts are forbidden from applying harmless error analysis to violations of the
public trial right,21 the court of appeals maintained that excluding Craven’s
family members was “harmless error” given all the evidence against him,
which was indeed substantial.22 To bolster its argument, the court of appeals
noted that because the purpose of the Georgia trial closure statute was to
protect the child witness,23 any error by the trial court in excluding Craven’s
family was of no account because the statute did “not necessarily confer[] a
right upon the defendant.”24 Of course, the Constitution confers such a right,
but the court of appeals concluded that Craven waived any constitutional claim
because he failed to raise a constitutional objection until after the victim had
testified.25 Classifying this sequence of events as a waiver was a mistake,

18

Waller, 467 U.S. at 48 (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 511–12 (1984)).
Craven, 664 S.E.2d at 923–25.
20 Id. at 924 (citation omitted).
21 Waller, 467 U.S. at 49–50.
22 Craven, 664 S.E.2d at 924. The medical evidence showed “repeated sexual assaults,” the victim “drew
explicit pictures reflecting what had happened,” and the victim’s mother and grandmother testified. Id. at 924–
25.
23 Id. at 924.
24 Id. (quoting the opinion of the trial court). In its failure to find error in the trial court’s exclusion of
Craven’s family members, the Georgia Court of Appeals also overlooked a concern expressed by the Supreme
Court regarding exclusion of a defendant’s friends and relatives. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271–72
(1948) (“[W]ithout exception all courts have held that an accused is at the very least entitled to have his
friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged.”); see also Carson v.
Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2005) (“‘The exclusion of courtroom observers, especially a defendant’s
family members and friends, even from part of a criminal trial, is not a step to be taken lightly.’” (quoting
Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772, 776 (2d Cir. 1996))).
25 Craven, 664 S.E.2d. at 924.
19
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however, as Craven did not intentionally relinquish his right to object.26 Even
if Craven did in fact fail to make a timely objection, these events still should
have been subject to plain error review, under which appellate courts will
consider any error that affects “substantial rights,” including even those errors
not brought to the court’s attention.27 In this case, application of the plain error
rule should have triggered an order for a new trial.28
The Craven decision exemplifies two trends: (1) the tendency of trial courts
to look past the straightforward, explicit requirements of Waller; and (2) the
understandable reluctance of some appellate courts to reverse convictions of
appellants who appear obviously guilty, in spite of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
pronouncement that violation of the public trial right always constitutes
structural error.29 That reluctance is often, though certainly not always,30
reinforced by the nature of the crime and the substantial evidence of guilt in
these cases. Because courtroom closure is frequently employed in child sex
abuse cases—where the crimes are exceptionally deplorable, the testimony is
disturbing and graphic, and the victims are especially vulnerable—it takes a
strong-willed jurist to reverse such a conviction, even when the Constitution
clearly requires it. And when a defendant fails to properly object, the
temptation to uphold the trial court’s closure order may be irresistible,
regardless of the fact that the plain error rule should still require reversal.31
But does upholding courtroom closure in the face of constitutional error
really raise novel issues? After all, the question of when legal error should be
tolerated is not new,32 and while a criminal defendant has a constitutional right

26 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (“Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas
forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938))).
27 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it
was not brought to the court’s attention.”); see also Lynd v. State, 414 S.E.2d 5, 8 n.2 (Ga. 1992) (“‘Plain
error’ is that which is ‘so clearly erroneous as to result in a likelihood of a grave miscarriage of justice’ or
which ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of a judicial proceeding.’” (quoting United
States v. Fuentes-Coba, 738 F.2d 1191, 1196 (11th Cir. 1984))).
28 See discussion infra Part III (detailing the authority and rationale for sua sponte plain error review).
29 See infra note 189 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of “structural error”).
30 See infra Part IV.E (discussing Presley v. State, 658 S.E.2d 773 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d, 674 S.E.2d
909 (Ga. 2009), rev’d per curiam, 78 U.S.L.W. 4051 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2010) and criticizing the failure of Georgia
Courts to follow Waller).
31 See discussion infra Part III.
32 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 5, at 1173–83 (reviewing the twentieth century history of harmless error
jurisprudence).
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to a fair trial, the proceeding need not be entirely free from error.33 Because
the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the defendant’s guilt or
innocence, and because public respect for the criminal process is enhanced by
arriving at a just result, it is important that appellate courts tolerate the
inevitable presence of immaterial error.34 However, over the past forty years
the tendency of courts to tolerate immaterial error has expanded to include
even grave constitutional errors.35
In light of this trend, is there anything to be said about the reluctance of
courts to uphold the public trial right beyond the predictable observation that
courts are often called to balance cardinal principles of individual rights
against the need for efficient justice—and that this balancing poses a special
challenge when defendants appear obviously guilty? The answer is decidedly
yes, and the reason is straightforward: throughout its modern jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has never wavered from its holding that violation of the public
trial right is among a small class of constitutional errors that remain
automatically reversible and can never be subject to harmless error analysis.36
In the eyes of the Court, such “structural errors” affect the framework of the
trial itself and thus impugn the fairness and integrity of the entire proceeding.37
The fact that the Court has explicitly reaffirmed this position38 while it has
steadily weakened post-trial protection for other serious constitutional errors39
further strengthens the case for consistent enforcement of the public trial right.

33 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (“As we have stressed on more than one occasion,
the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.”).
34 Id.
35 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967); see also Edwards, supra note 5, at 1186 (“Chapman
heralded a major expansion in both the number of violations subject to harmless-error analysis and the
frequency with which that analysis is employed.”).
36 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
37 Id.
38 See id. at 294 (White, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the application of the harmless error rule to
admission of involuntary confessions while also noting that violation of the public trial right is a constitutional
error “that invalidate[s] a conviction even though there may be no reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty
and would be convicted absent the trial error”); see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69
(1997) (discussing, but not deciding, whether the failure to submit the materiality of a false statement to the
jury affected the defendant’s substantial rights, but noting that violation of the right to a public trial is
“structural error,” which does affect substantial rights).
39 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306 (“[M]ost constitutional errors can be harmless.”); see also Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 652 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“By now it goes without saying that
harmless-error review is of almost universal application; there are few errors that may not be forgiven as
harmless.” (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306–07)).
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In addition to mistakenly applying the harmless error rule, trial and
appellate courts often make four other mistakes that violate the Waller scheme:
(1) they ignore the plain error doctrine, which requires reversal in the face of a
bona fide violation of a defendant’s public trial right, even when the defendant
fails to object;40 (2) they resort to post hoc findings to justify closure when the
trial court fails to hold a hearing and make the findings required by Waller;41
(3) they apply a doctrine of “partial closure” to suggest that the four-part
Waller test need not apply under certain circumstances;42 and (4) they assert
that state trial closure statutes provide a sufficient proxy for the Waller test and
then hold that any failure to follow the state trial closure statute is irrelevant
because the law is for the benefit of the victim.43 Although the Supreme Court
has set clear rules for what constitutes a violation of the public trial right, it has
yet to address any of these particular issues since deciding Waller.
This Comment draws on the Court’s jurisprudence upholding the public
trial right, and on related opinions of federal and state courts, to show how
each of the rationales used by trial and appellate courts to circumvent the
Waller rules is flawed, and to argue for more rigorous enforcement of the
public trial right. Part I discusses the origins of the public trial right, including
its assertion by invoking both the First and Sixth Amendments, and cases
leading up to Waller. Part II details the significance of Waller, the origins of
the harmless and structural error doctrines and their application to
constitutional error, and the rule that violation of the public trial right is always
structural—and never harmless—error. Part III explains why reversal is
required under the plain error rule when violations of the public trial right
occur, even when the defendant fails to object. Part IV examines in more
detail how courts have treated—and often undermined—the public trial right
by adopting suspect practices like providing post hoc rationales to justify
closure and citing state law doctrines to relieve themselves of the responsibility
to follow Waller.
In sum, this Comment makes the case for corrective reform and argues that
appellate courts must: (1) refrain from applying harmless error analysis to
40 See discussion infra Part III (arguing for the consistent application of plain error review to violations
of Waller).
41 See discussion infra Part IV.A (examining cases in which post hoc justifications are used to affirm
erroneous courtroom closure).
42 See discussion infra Part IV.B (examining cases in which courts fail to appropriately balance interests
as required by Waller).
43 See discussion infra Part IV.C–D (examining cases in which courts use state closure statutes as a proxy
for incomplete and unsatisfactory application of the requirements of Waller).
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violations of the public trial right; (2) regularly subject violations of Waller to
plain error review; (3) require application of the four-part Waller test in all
cases of courtroom closure—even if such closure occurs pursuant to state law;
(4) refrain from using post hoc findings to justify closure; (5) reject the
argument that closure pursuant to state law absolves trial courts of the
obligation to comply with Waller; and (6) recognize that the benefit-of-thevictim doctrine cannot excuse a constitutional mistake that is triggered by a
statutory error that violates Waller. In Presley v. Georgia, decided January 19,
2010, the U.S. Supreme Court once again reiterated the importance of the
public trial right, but its decision did not address any of the above issues.44
I. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE PUBLIC TRIAL GUARANTEE
This Part discusses the origin of the public trial right as well as the
countervailing reasons most often invoked to justify courtroom closure. While
state and federal courts have historically made firm pronouncements about the
sanctity of the public trial right, it was not until the early 1980s that the
Supreme Court finally arrived at a coherent set of rules for balancing the
competing interests of defendants, victim-witnesses, and the public. This Part
discusses the cases that created the legal framework for balancing these and
other interests, and explains the rationale behind the rules the Court developed,
culminating in Waller v. Georgia in 1984. This Part also compares different
closure cases and the rationale employed in each to show how courtroom
closures were often as arbitrary as the logic employed by the individual trial
judges who ordered them—or as valid as any particular appellate court held
them to be.
A. The Origins of the Public Trial Guarantee
Although the right to a public trial existed under English common law,45 its
adoption as part of the Bill of Rights46 stemmed from a greater appreciation for
44

78 U.S.L.W. 4051 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2010) (per curiam).
Max Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 382 (1932) (quoting Matthew Hale, writing
around 1670, that evidence is “given ‘in the open court and in the presence of the parties, counsel, and all bystanders . . . .’”).
46 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Prior to ratification of the Constitution in 1791, the constitutions of six states
provided for a speedy trial right. Radin, supra note 45, at 383 n.5a. Only Pennsylvania specified that the
proceeding be “public,” while North Carolina required that criminal convictions by jury verdict be rendered
“in open court.” Id.; see also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 267 n.15 (1948). For a concise overview of the
Colonial attitude toward the public trial right and related observations about the adoption of the Sixth
Amendment, see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 424–27 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring and
45
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the rights of the accused in America than could be found in Britain.47 As Max
Radin observed, although a defendant was entitled to a public trial in England,
the privilege did not count for much.48 The authorities held a defendant
virtually incommunicado until trial, denied him the right to prepare for his own
defense, and gave no notice of the evidence against him until trial.49 A
defendant also had no right to counsel, no right to confront witnesses against
him, and no right to call witnesses on his own behalf—and even if he could, a
defendant would have had no idea what evidence the witnesses might give
because he had no right to examine them beforehand.50 According to Radin:
Under these circumstances it is more than doubtful that it was the
prisoner’s interest which created the [public trial] practice. We may
well imagine that the poor wretches who stood in the dock could not
have highly valued the fact that, for a brief period, there would be a
little audience to see them arraigned, convicted, and sentenced—all
three of which events, in those sturdy times, might well take place in
51
a single day.

Taking into account the totality of these proceedings, the public aspect of
such trials probably did less to protect the rights of the accused and more to
reinforce the legitimacy of the convictions obtained.52 However, irrespective
of what may have been the original function of the public trial guarantee under
these conditions, its effect has been hailed by many.53 One supporter was
Jeremy Bentham, who famously observed in 1827 that “[w]ithout publicity, all

dissenting). Following ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791, a majority of states adopted constitutional
requirements for a public trial, borrowing language from the Sixth Amendment. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 267;
see also Gannett, 443 U.S. at 414 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (“Forty-eight of the fifty
States protect the right to a public trial in one way or another. Forty-five have constitutional provisions
specifically guaranteeing the right . . . .”).
47 See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268–69, 269 n.22 (recounting the “excesses of the English Court of
Star Chamber” in which the accused “was grilled in secret [and] often tortured, in an effort to obtain a
confession”).
48 Radin, supra note 45, at 384.
49 Id. at 383 (citing JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 1 HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 350
(1883)).
50 Id. at 383–84.
51 Id. at 384.
52 United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 853 n.6 (3d Cir. 1978) (“It is doubtful that at common law
the requirement that trials be held in public grew up as a right of the accused at all.”); see also Douglas Hay,
Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTHCENTURY ENGLAND 17, 48 (1975) (arguing that the “peculiar genius of the law [was that it] allowed the rulers
of England to make the courts a selective instrument of class justice, yet simultaneously to proclaim the law’s
incorruptible impartiality, and absolute determinacy”).
53 See infra notes 54, 58–62 and accompanying text.
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other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of
small account.”54
When discussing the main impetus for the adoption of the Sixth
Amendment public trial guarantee, American courts and commentators have
been quick to cite the “historical warnings of the evil practice of the Star
Chamber in England,”55 the infamous practices of the Spanish Inquisition, and
the lettres de cachet of the French monarchy.56 As the Supreme Court
explained, “[a]ll of these institutions obviously symbolized a menace to liberty.
In the hands of despotic groups each of them had become an instrument for the
suppression of political and religious heresies in ruthless disregard of the right
of an accused to a fair trial.”57
American courts often cite Thomas Cooley, the renowned nineteenth
century constitutional scholar, when articulating the values of a public trial. A
public proceeding, he observed, “is for the benefit of the accused; that the
public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned and that the
presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of
their responsibility and to the importance of their functions . . . .”58 Crediting
Hale and Blackstone, courts also have emphasized the importance of a public
trial in drawing out persons who may know the facts of a case and thus deliver
important testimony.59 Public trials produce a more reliable result because
they presumably discourage perjury60 and engender basic fairness.61 As Justice
Harlan observed nearly two decades before Waller:
54

1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827).
Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1917). But see Radin, supra note 45, at 386–87 (“As
far as the Star Chamber is concerned, the Parliamentary opponents of that tribunal never seem to have picked
out secrecy as characteristic of it or as a reprehensible practice in it. . . . There was apparently nothing secret
about the practice of this court, and the grievance the Parliament had against it was rather its power, than the
method in which that power was exercised.”).
56 Radin, supra note 45, at 388 (“The lettre de cachet was a document bearing the king’s private seal
(cachet) . . . [and was] most frequently used as a means of interfering in the ordinary course of justice and of
arbitrarily ordering the indefinite imprisonment of any particular person.”).
57 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 269–70.
58 Id. at 270 n.25 (citing 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 647 (8th ed. 1927)).
59 Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58, 59–60 (9th Cir. 1944); see also State v. Klem, 438 N.W.2d
798, 803 n.5 (N.D. 1989) (observing that the presence of family members might assure “testimonial
trustworthiness”).
60 See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (“In addition to ensuring that judge and prosecutor carry
out their duties responsibly, a public trial encourages witnesses to come forward and discourages perjury.”).
61 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (citing Hale and Blackstone for
the “importance of openness to the proper functioning of a trial [because] it gave assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants,
55
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Essentially, the public-trial guarantee embodies a view of human
nature, true as a general rule, that judges, lawyers, witnesses, and
jurors will perform their respective functions more responsibly in an
open court than in secret proceedings. A fair trial is the objective,
62
and “public trial” is an institutional safeguard for attaining it.

Public trials also advance the much broader social purpose that ‘“[i]n this
country it is a first principle that the people have the right to know what is
done in their courts.’”63
1. In re Oliver
The public trial right has been held in high esteem by courts and
commentators alike, but it was not until In re Oliver,64 in 1948, that the
Supreme Court held that the Public Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment
applied to state criminal proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment.65 In
In re Oliver, the Court reversed the criminal contempt conviction of a man
who had been summoned by a Michigan judge to testify privately as a witness
in “a ‘one-man grand jury’ investigation into alleged gambling and official
corruption.”66 Finding the witness not credible, the judge convicted him of
contempt and sentenced him to sixty days in jail.67 The Michigan Supreme
Court upheld the conviction, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the “mantle of secrecy” surrounding the proceedings violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.68 In re Oliver was a landmark Supreme
Court case, but it drew on earlier decisions of the lower federal courts that
were no less insistent on enforcing the public trial right.

and decisions based on secret bias or partiality”). But see Radin, supra note 45, at 384 (“[I]t is clear that [Hale
and Blackstone] are scarcely thinking of the privileges of the accused, but of the effectiveness of the process of
trial, which in the minds of most official persons of all times means the expedition and frequency of conviction
and not the facilitation of acquittal.”).
62 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
63 See State v. Keeler, 156 P. 1080, 1084 (Mont. 1916) (quoting In re Shortridge, 34 P. 227, 228 (Cal.
1893)). “The people are interested in knowing, and have the right to know, how their servants—the judge,
county attorney, sheriff, and clerk—conduct the public’s business.” Id. at 1083.
64 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
65 Barbara Hricko Wait, Comment, Constitutional Law—First Amendment—Access to Government
Proceedings—Voir Dire of Jurors—Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS.
ANN. 199, 202 (1985) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273).
66 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 258. The proceeding was authorized under Michigan law. Id. at 261.
67 Id. at 259.
68 Id. at 273.
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2. Davis v. United States
In 1917, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals declared in Davis v. United
States69 that “[t]he corrective influence of public attendance at trials for crime
was considered important to the liberty of the people, and it is only by steadily
supporting the safeguard that it is kept from being undermined and finally
destroyed.”70 In Davis, the defendants were charged in federal court in
connection with a train robbery, and by the end of the trial an excitable crowd
had gathered.71 Anticipating a disruption, the trial judge cleared the courtroom
of everyone but members of the bar, defendants’ relatives, and newspaper
reporters.72 The defendant was convicted and later appealed. Noting that the
courtroom was not overcrowded and that no “person was making a disturbance
or threatening to do so,”73 the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial on Sixth
Amendment grounds. The Davis opinion is also noteworthy on two other
counts: (1) it emphatically declared that violations of the public trial right are
not harmless error;74 and (2) it compared eleven leading cases upholding
courtroom closures with six others in which the exclusion of spectators was
held unconstitutional under state provisions identical to the Sixth
Amendment.75 In doing so, Davis characterized the exceptions to the public
trial right as “few” and “based upon considerations of public morals and peace
and good order in the courtrooms.”76 In contrast, those decisions finding a
69

247 F. 394 (8th Cir. 1917).
Id. at 395.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 394.
73 Id. at 395.
74 Id. at 398–99 (“It is urged that no prejudice to defendants was shown. A violation of the constitutional
right necessarily implies prejudice and more than that need not appear. Furthermore, it would be difficult, if
not impossible, in such cases for a defendant to point to any definite, personal injury. To require him to do so
would impair or destroy the safeguard.”).
75 Id. at 396–98 (“We turn now to those [cases] in which [the courtroom closures] have been
disapproved.”). As the discussion of State v. Osborne, Tilton v. State, and State v. Hensley in this subsection
reveals, the closures at issue in those cases were held invalid on state constitutional grounds. See infra notes
87–97 and accompanying text. In People v. Hartman, the court did not explicitly distinguish between the
California and federal constitutions, but clearly stated that the closure was “in direct violation of that provision
of the constitution which says that a party accused of crime has a right to a public trial.” 37 P. 153, 154 (Cal.
1894). Likewise, the closures in People v. Yeager and People v. Murray were held to violate section 28 of
article 6 of the Michigan Constitution. See People v. Yeager, 71 N.W. 491, 492 (1897) (relying on Murray and
stating that “if such a trial as is provided for by the [state trial closure] statute is not a public trial, the act is
plainly in conflict with section 28 of article 6 of the constitution . . . .”); People v. Murray, 50 N.W. 995, 997
(Mich. 1891) (“We cannot accept the conclusion of the judge, ‘that the trial was at all times during the same a
public trial, within the meaning of the [state] constitution.’”); infra notes 191–94 and accompanying text
(discussing Murray).
76 Davis, 247 F. at 396.
70
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violation of the public trial right were described as “well founded in principle
and reason.”77
In reality, there was not much of a distinction between those cases where
the closures were ruled erroneous and those where the closures were upheld.
The following brief comparative analysis reveals that the differences in
outcome did not stem from the application of a well-ordered rule to different
facts—after all, there was no such rule until the 1980s. Instead, the variation
was more likely the product of relatively arbitrary judicial decision making
against the backdrop of controversial circumstances. In this context some
courts simply appear to have been more willing than others to accept the
implicit moralistic reasoning justifying closure. For example, in Benedict v.
People,78 the defendant was convicted of “the infamous crime against
nature,”79 the trial involved “the recital of disgusting facts,”80 and the selective
exclusion of spectators was upheld.81 In State v. McCool,82 the prosecution
asked for all women to be excluded, as the county attorney “was about to refer
to some of the evidence which was unfit for ladies to hear.”83 And in People v.
Swafford,84 everyone but the judge, jurors, witnesses, and persons connected
with the case was excluded on the grounds that “the word ‘public’ in the
Constitution was used in opposition to secret, and [thus the] defendant was not
denied a public trial.”85 Like Benedict, the exclusions in McCool and Swafford
were upheld, though Swafford was eventually “held unsound.”86
In contrast to these ostensibly legitimate closures, the Davis court cited
State v. Osborne,87 a rape case in which the exclusion of all but the defendant,
the attorneys, the jury, officers of the court, and testifying witnesses “was
vigorously condemned” by the Oregon Supreme Court on state constitutional
grounds.88 Likewise, in Tilton v. State,89 a case of adultery with a fourteen77

Id. at 398.
46 P. 637 (Colo. 1896).
79 Id. (referring to the offense of sodomy).
80 Id. at 638.
81 Id.
82 9 P. 745 (Kan. 1886).
83 Id. at 747.
84 3 P. 809 (Cal. 1884).
85 Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 396–97 (8th Cir. 1917).
86 See id. at 397–98 (noting that Swafford was “an extreme case” that was later “held unsound” by People
v. Hartman, 37 P. 153, 154 (Cal. 1894)).
87 103 P. 62 (Or. 1909).
88 Davis, 247 F. at 397. See also Osborne, 103 P. at 63–64 (“It is argued that the procedure complained
of is in violation of the plain provisions of both our national and state Constitutions. . . . [W]hatever the rule
78
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year-old girl, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial court could have
excluded, with “perfect legality,”90 all minors and women from the courtroom,
but that its order banishing everyone not connected with the case was “too
sweeping”91 under the state constitution.92 There, the judge had closed the
courtroom, citing state law authorizing trial courts to clear the courtroom of
“‘all or any portion of the audience’” in “‘any cause of seduction or divorce, or
other case where the evidence is vulgar or obscene, or relates to the improper
acts of the sexes, and tends to debauch the morals of the young . . . .’”93 And
in State v. Hensley,94 a case of statutory rape, when the trial was adjourned to a
smaller courtroom to hear “immoral or obscene testimony,”95 the public was
excluded, but reporters were allowed to remain.96 The Ohio Supreme Court
held that “the order of exclusion was too general . . . and that the defendant
was not accorded . . . a public trial.”97
on that subject may be with reference to the national organic law on the subject, the Constitution of our state is
to the same effect.” (citations omitted)).
89 62 S.E. 651 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908).
90 Id. at 654.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 651 (citing GA. CONST. of 1877, art. I, § 1, para. 5, which “provides, among other things, that
‘every person charged with an offense against the laws of this state . . . shall have a public trial’”). The
Georgia Constitution was revised in 1983, during a special session of the General Assembly at which the
public trial provision was moved from article VI, the judicial article, to article I, section 1, paragraph 11(a).
See MELVIN B. HILL, JR., THE GEORGIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 29, 42–43 (1994); see
also H.R. 4 136th Gen. Assem., Extraordinary Sess. (Ga. 1981) (proposing a new constitution for the State of
Georgia), available at http://www.sos.georgia.gov/archives/what_do_we_have/online_records/historic_
documents/1983_georgia_constitution/default.htm.
93 Tilton, 62 S.E. at 651 (citing section 5296 of the Georgia Civil Code of 1895). The constitutionality of
the statute was not challenged. Id.
94 79 N.E. 462 (Ohio 1906).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 464. In holding the closure invalid on state constitutional grounds, the court observed that
“[p]rovisions respecting a public trial similar to that of our Constitution . . . are found in the federal
Constitution, and in most, if not all, of the Constitutions of the states of the Union . . . .” Id. at 463. Hensley
also contains an impassioned justification for the application of the plain error rule to violations of the public
trial right:
[C]ounsel for the state [insists] that, because no specific objection or exception was entered by
the defendant at the time the order was made or was being enforced, the error, if any was
committed, cannot now be taken advantage of. This objection ignores the force and effect of the
constitutional provision. The right to a public trial is guarantied [sic]. It is of the same high
order of right as the other guaranties [sic] embodied in the section—that to appear and defend in
person and with counsel, that to meet the witnesses face to face and have compulsory process,
and that to a trial by jury. The right cannot be waived by silence any more than can the right to
be tried by jury where the accusation is a felony and the plea is not guilty.
Id. at 464.
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Of course, the right to a public trial is not an unqualified one. The next
section more closely examines the reasons cited to justify courtroom closure
and shows how core principles and lofty rhetoric favoring the public trial right
can give way to other interests—some more credible than others.
B. Countervailing Values and Interests: The Justification for Courtroom
Closure
Most discussions of the public trial guarantee take as their premise the ageold fear of despotic regimes,98 as well as concern over “possible abuse of
judicial power,”99 and the need to “safeguard against any attempt to
employ . . . courts as instruments of persecution.”100 Perhaps it is because of
these concerns that courtrooms have been closed in the United States relatively
rarely by government officials pursuing their own objectives or seeking to
quash dissent.101 Instead, as evidenced by the cases discussed in Davis,102
courtroom closures since the late nineteenth century appear to have been
triggered most often by sex crime prosecutions.103 Historically, these closures
have been justified by a desire to preserve “public morals and public

98 See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268–70 (1948) (discussing the “traditional Anglo-American
distrust for secret trials”); see also People v. Murray, 50 N.W. 995, 998 (Mich. 1891) (citing the “great abuses
practiced in England . . . in conducting criminal prosecutions” as the impetus for including the public trial right
in the 1850 Michigan Constitution and “in all of the constitutions of the American states and of the United
States”).
99 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270.
100 Id.
101 As the discussion in Davis of the cases reveals, government misconduct is not frequently at issue in
cases where judges order courtroom closure. See Part I.A.2 (discussing Davis); infra note 103 (listing sex
crime cases precipitating closure). For an example of a courtroom closure which does appear motivated by a
desire to shield government misconduct, see Murray, 50 N.W. at 996–98 (holding unconstitutional on state
constitutional grounds the exclusion of all but “respectable citizens” from the courtroom during the trial of a
defendant charged with murdering a police officer, where the only persons allowed entry were “about a dozen
policemen, three or four detectives, several police commissioners, and others apparently interested in the
conviction of [the] defendant”).
102 See supra Part I.A.2.
103 Of the seventeen cases discussed in Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 396–98 (8th Cir. 1917), eleven
involved offenses of a sexual nature: Grimmett v. State, 2 S.W. 631 (Tex. Ct. App. 1886) (assault with intent to
rape); Benedict v. People, 46 P. 637 (Colo. 1896) (sodomy); State v. Nyhus, 124 N.W. 71 (N.D. 1909) (rape of
a girl under fourteen); Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488 (9th Cir. 1919) (rape); State v. Callahan, 110 N.W.
342 (Minn. 1907) (convicted of assault with intent to rape); People v. Swafford, 3 P. 809, 809 (Cal. 1884)
(noting that the defendant “was charged with abducting a chaste female under age”); State v. Osborne, 103 P.
62 (Or. 1909) (assault with intent to rape); Tilton v. State, 62 S.E. 651 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908) (adultery with a
fourteen-year-old girl); State v. Hensley, 79 N.E. 462 (Ohio 1906) (statutory rape); People v. Hartman, 37 P.
153 (Cal. 1894) (assault with intent to commit rape); People v. Yeager, 71 N.W. 491 (Mich. 1897) (assault
with intent to commit rape).
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decency”104 or to elicit sensitive testimony from victims.105
Other
justifications for courtroom closure include preserving the anonymity of a
police officer in an undercover “buy and bust” drug investigation,106
encouraging testimony by witnesses who fear retaliation,107 and maintaining
public safety and order in the courtroom.108 Preventing disclosure of sensitive
government information is also a compelling interest that sometimes justifies
closure.109

104 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 441 (Victor H. Lane ed., 7th ed. 1903) (noting
the “evidences of human depravity which the trial must necessarily bring to light”); see also Harris v.
Stephens, 361 F.2d 888, 890–91 (8th Cir. 1966) (calling the practice of closing the courtroom to spectators
during testimony of “a twenty-three year old virgin” who was the victim of rape “a frequent and accepted
practice when the lurid details of such a crime must be related by a young lady”); Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Super. Ct., 423 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Mass. 1981) (observing that while “the constitutional right of access to trials
arises in part from an unbroken tradition of openness . . . . [t]here is at least one notable exception to this
history. In cases involving sexual assaults, portions of trials have been closed to some segments of the public,
even when the victim was an adult.” (citations omitted)), rev’d, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
105 See Callahan, 110 N.W. at 345 (upholding the constitutionality of courtroom closure to facilitate
testimony by a rape victim who was “seriously embarrassed by . . . a crowd of spectators”); Grimmett, 2 S.W.
at 633–34 (upholding, under the state constitution, the exclusion of most spectators, in part “to relieve the
witness of the embarrassment which . . . the disorderly conduct of [the] crowd[] occasioned”). But see
Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1944) (holding that “[i]t would be denying the defendant
his presumption of innocence” to hold that a rape victim “must be relieved of . . . embarrassment” because she
is called to testify about the crime “and her shame”).
106 See Bowden v. Keane, 237 F.3d 125, 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding “narrow courtroom closure”
where an undercover narcotics officer articulated “even a generalized fear that his safety could be endangered
by testifying in open court, and explain[ed] in rough terms the basis of his fear”). But see Vidal v. Williams,
31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994) (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas corpus where the defendant’s
parents were excluded from the courtroom “to prevent them from recognizing [the arresting officer] . . . and
disclosing his identity” because the parents “lived in a ‘high drug area’” and might possibly encounter the
officer or “disclos[e] his identity as retribution for their son’s conviction.”).
107 See, e.g., United States v. Farmer, 32 F.3d 369, 372 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding closure where the
evidence supported “the victim’s well-reasoned fear of [the defendant]”).
108 See, e.g., People v. Kerrigan, 14 P. 849, 850 (Cal. 1887) (upholding courtroom closure where the
defendant, convicted of assault with intent to commit murder, had addressed the judge and officers of court
with “vulgar and profane language,” thereby creating so much commotion that the spectators were ordered to
leave the courtroom).
109 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984). A thorough exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of
this Comment. However, for a relevant discussion in the context of a recent national security prosecution, see
United States v. Abu Marzook, 412 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Ill. 2006). In Abu Marzook, the courtroom was
ordered closed during testimony of Israeli intelligence agents, but the court held that a suppression hearing
authorized under the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. (2006), also must “square[] with
the Constitution” and ‘“meet the test set out in Press-Enterprise and its predecessors.’” Abu Marzook, 412 F.
Supp. 2d at 924–28 (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 47).
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With the advent of the victims’ rights movement110 and heightened
sensitivity toward sex crime victims in particular, prosecutors and courts have
often justified courtroom closure as necessary to protect the dignity and
psychological integrity of the victim111 and to encourage victim testimony.112
Courts have paid particular attention to these issues where children and
teenagers are concerned.113
Without clear guidelines for courtroom closure it is not surprising that
different judges assessing even similar facts and weighing similar interests,
such as protecting the psychological integrity of a rape victim, might decide
differently about excluding the public.114 What is important to note is the
range of countervailing interests that have been cited to justify courtroom
closure. The next section examines the leading U.S. Supreme Court cases on
this issue—including two where closure was requested by the defendant in the
interest of a fair trial115—to explain how the Court ultimately settled on clear
procedural requirements, culminating in Waller. These procedures ensure that
110

See Frank Carrington & George Nicholson, The Victims’ Movement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come,
11 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1984); see also Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims’ Rights
Movement, 3 UTAH L. REV. 517, 524 (1985) (“The early voices [of the victims’ rights movement] were
frequently feminine . . . . Their concern was for a particular victim, the victim of rape.”).
111 See United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691, 694–96 (7th Cir. 1977) (upholding the trial
court’s dismissal of spectators because testimony by the victim, a “21-year-old unmarried woman,” about her
rape by four men “posed a substantial threat of indignity to the witness”).
112 See Farmer, 32 F.3d at 372. But see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607–10 (1982)
(criticizing as “speculative in empirical terms” the claim that mandatory trial closure during testimony of a
minor victim “will lead to an increase in the number of minor sex victims coming forward”).
113 See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607 (noting that the interests cited by the State of Massachusetts
justifying mandatory trial closure during the testimony of minor victims “are reducible to two: the protection
of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment; and the encouragement of such
victims to come forward and testify in a truthful and credible manner”). For a discussion of child victims of
sexual abuse and the legal process, including the issues raised by courtroom closure during child testimony in
light of the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants, see Donald C. Bross, Protecting Child Witnesses,
in FOUNDATIONS OF CHILD ADVOCACY: LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE MALTREATED CHILD 117, 117–26
(Donald C. Bross & Laura Freeman Michaels eds., 1987) and JAMES SELKIN & PETER G.W. SCHOUTEN, THE
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASE IN THE COURTROOM: A SOURCE BOOK 91–102 (1987). See also AM.
PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., NAT’L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 441, 441–62 (3d ed. 2004) (“Testifying in court can be a frightening
experience for crime victims, but it is especially so for child witnesses. Courtrooms are large and intimidating,
and a child witness must make public an intensely private and shameful experience in the presence of the
abuser.”). But see McIntosh v. United States, 933 A.2d 370, 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (reversing defendant’s
conviction of misdemeanor sexual abuse of a twelve-year-old girl on the ground that the partial closure of the
courtroom during the child’s testimony violated Waller, in spite of the fact that the child, who had “limited
mental capacity” and other problems, would suffer “trauma and embarrassment” from testifying in public).
114 See discussion of cases supra notes 105–06.
115 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368, 379–84 (1979).
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trial courts properly balance the interests involved when deciding to close the
courtroom and require that trial courts create a suitable record for appellate
review.
C. Asserting the Public Trial Guarantee Through the First Amendment
In re Oliver, decided in 1948, held that the Sixth Amendment applies to
state criminal proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment,116 but it took
another three decades for the Supreme Court to hold that the press and public
have the right to attend state criminal trials under the First Amendment.117 In
arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the history of
openness in criminal proceedings,118 which it saw as essential to both the
proper functioning of the criminal justice system and America’s “republican
system of self-government.”119 The interests of the public and the press must
be balanced, however, against the defendant’s right to a fair trial, as well as
other interests previously discussed, such as the anonymity of undercover
police officers, or the need to elicit sensitive testimony from sex crime
victims.120 The Court ultimately articulated the same criteria for evaluating the
constitutionality of courtroom closures under both the First and Sixth
Amendments, but these early First Amendment cases laid the foundation for
the four-part test the Court eventually established in Waller.121

116

See supra Part I.A.1.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575–80 (plurality opinion). Although Justice Burger authored the
plurality opinion, in which he was joined by Justices White and Stevens, the various concurrences of Justices
Marshall, Brennan, Stewart and Blackmun all agreed that the First Amendment ensured a right of public
access to criminal trials. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented. See generally Lawrence J. Morris, Note,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Closure of Trials—The Press and the Public Have a First Amendment Right of
Access to Attend Criminal Trials, Which Cannot Be Closed Absent an Overriding Interest. Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980), 64 MARQ. L. REV. 717 (1981) (discussing U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence concerning the public trial right in the context of Gannett and Richmond Newspapers);
George W. Kelly, Richmond Newspapers and the First Amendment Right of Access, 18 AKRON L. REV. 33
(1984); William K. Meyer, Note, Evaluating Court Closures After Richmond Newspapers: Using Sixth
Amendment Standards to Enforce a First Amendment Right, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 304, 309 (1982).
118 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573 (plurality opinion) (“From this unbroken, uncontradicted
history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, we are bound to conclude that a presumption
of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice.”).
119 Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
120 See supra Part I.B.
121 See articles cited supra note 117.
117
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1. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia was the first case to establish the
right of the press and public to attend criminal trials, but it had an unusual
procedural history.122 After the defendant was tried three times unsuccessfully
for murder (the first conviction was reversed on appeal and two mistrials
followed),123 he asked the trial court in the fourth proceeding to close the
courtroom, and the motion was unopposed.124 In ordering the courtroom
cleared “of all parties except the witnesses when they testify,”125 the trial court
cited a state law that permitted the exclusion of “any persons whose presence
would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused
to a public trial shall not be violated.”126
In the plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger127 wrote that, based on an
“unbroken, uncontradicted history” of open criminal trials,128 the “fundamental
right” of the public to attend criminal trials is “implicit in the guarantees of the
First Amendment”129 and applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.130 Because the trial court had: (1) made no findings to support
the closure, (2) conducted no inquiry into alternatives, and (3) failed to
recognize a constitutional right for either the public or the press to attend the
trial, the Supreme Court held the closure improper under the First
Amendment.131
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens hailed Richmond
Newspapers as a “watershed case” for “unequivocally hold[ing] that an
arbitrary interference with access to important information is an abridgment

122

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 559–63 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 559. The defendant had been convicted of second-degree murder, but the Virginia Supreme
Court reversed because a blood-stained shirt “had been improperly admitted into evidence.” Id.; see also
Morris, supra note 117, at 722 n.28.
124 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S at 559–60 (plurality opinion).
125 Id. at 560.
126 Id. at 560 n.2 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266 (Supp. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127 Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices White and Stevens, with four other Justices concurring in
the judgment. Id. at 558 (syllabus). Justice Powell took no part in the decision. Id. However, in Justice
Powell’s concurring opinion in Gannett v. DePasquale, he indicated a belief that the First Amendment gives
the press a limited “right of access” to criminal trials. 443 U.S. 368, 397–98 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
128 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S at 556, 573 (plurality opinion).
129 Id. at 580.
130 Id. Justice Rehnquist disagreed, filing the only dissent and rejecting any application of the First, Sixth,
or Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 605–06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also took his fellow
Justices to task for “smother[ing] a healthy pluralism which would ordinarily exist in a national government
embracing 50 States.” Id.
131 Id. at 580–81 (plurality opinion).
123
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of . . . the First Amendment.”132 In a separate concurrence, Justices Brennan
and Marshall went well beyond a discussion of access to information and
emphasized the “structural role” of the First Amendment “in securing and
fostering our republican system of self-government.”133
2. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale
Although Richmond Newspapers was a case of first impression regarding
the First Amendment right of the public to attend criminal trials, the Court had
struggled with many of the same issues under the framework of the Sixth
Amendment a year earlier in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.134 In Gannett, the
majority held that because the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is
“personal to the accused,”135 the public does not have an independent right
under either the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments to attend criminal trials.136
In that case—a murder trial—the trial court had approved, without objection, a
defense motion to close a pre-trial suppression hearing where “the unabated
buildup of adverse publicity had jeopardized the ability of the defendants to
receive a fair trial.”137 The posture of Gannett was thus quite similar to
Richmond Newspapers, where the request to close the courtroom had also been
made by the defendant and was unopposed, and the lower court had also
invoked the defendant’s right to a fair trial to justify the closure.138 Faced with
an apparent conflict between the interests of the public and the defendant, the
majority in Gannett concluded that the right to close the courtroom belonged to
the defendant.139 Making an analogy to the defendant’s right to waive a jury
trial, the majority observed that “if the defendant waives his right to a jury
trial, and the prosecutor and the judge consent, it could hardly be seriously
argued that a member of the public could demand a jury trial because of the
societal interest in that mode of fact-finding.”140
132

Id. at 582–83 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Kelly, supra note 117, at 36 (noting that under this
analysis the First Amendment is “linked to the process of communication necessary for the survival of
democracy”).
134 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
135 Id. at 379–80; see also id. at 381 n.9 (“Numerous commentators have also recognized that only a
defendant has a right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment.”). For a thorough discussion of Gannett,
see Morris, supra note 117, at 717–21.
136 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 391.
137 Id. at 375.
138 See discussion of Richmond Newspapers supra Part I.C.1.
139 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 379–80.
140 Id. at 383–84. But see United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 854 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that the
Sixth Amendment public trial right provides the public a qualified right of access to criminal trials and
133
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Other Justices, however, were not so quick to dispense with this “societal
interest” in public trials. In a dissent by Justice Blackmun, and joined by
Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall, the minority invoked the history of the
public trial right under English and American common law to support their
conclusion that the Sixth Amendment, incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits states from closing the courtroom to the public unless
“full and fair consideration [is given] to the public’s interests in maintaining an
open proceeding . . . . [n]otwithstanding the fact it is the accused who seeks to
close the trial.”141
Although the Court in Gannett was divided over the extent to which the
public trial right is strictly “personal to the accused”142 or whether the societal
value of criminal proceedings could trump the interests of a defendant, all nine
Justices were moving toward a consensus position requiring trial courts to
more rigorously consider these competing interests before excluding the public
from any criminal proceeding. It took the intervening decision in Richmond
Newspapers in 1980, and the deliberations of the Court in two subsequent
cases,143 to clearly establish the framework under which all Justices would
agree that “the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less
protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press
and public.”144 The decisions of the Court in Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court and Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court also set the
standards for the determination established in Waller regarding how courts
should enforce the Sixth Amendment public trial right of criminal
defendants.145
3. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court
In Richmond Newspapers,146 the Court held for the very first time that the
public and the press have a qualified First Amendment right to attend criminal
trials, but the Justices could not agree on a central rationale for their

observing that “‘justice cannot survive behind walls of silence,’ even when those walls are erected at the
behest of the defendant” (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966))).
141 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 414, 433 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 380.
143 Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596
(1982).
144 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984).
145 See Wait, supra note 65, at 223–24, 226–27.
146 See supra Part I.C.1.
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decision.147 Two years later, in Globe Newspaper,148 the Court “clarified and
strengthened the [First Amendment] right of access [previously] announced in
Richmond,”149 and its decision won the support of five Justices and a special
concurrence by Justice O’Connor.150 Globe Newspaper arose out of the
closure of the trial of a defendant charged with the rape of three teenage
girls.151 During pretrial motion hearings and throughout the trial, until the
defendant’s acquittal, the courtroom was closed pursuant to a Massachusetts
law that required the exclusion of the public and the press while testimony is
given by a victim under the age of eighteen in a sex offense trial.152 The
statute stated that in a trial for the rape of a minor, “the presiding justice shall
exclude the general public from the court room, admitting only such persons as
may have a direct interest in the case.”153
In finding the statute unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds, the
five-Justice majority placed particular emphasis on the “functional” character
and societal benefits of open criminal trials.154 Writing for the majority,
Justice Brennan reiterated the same arguments about the openness of criminal
trials contained in his Richmond Newspapers concurrence.155 But Justice
Brennan took the majority in Globe Newspaper further, applying strict scrutiny
to hold for the first time in the context of the closure of a criminal trial that
where “the State attempts to deny the right of access . . . it must be shown that
the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”156 Moreover, the “compelling
interest” must be established on a case-by-case basis.157

147 Jeanne L. Nowaczewski, Comment, The First Amendment Right of Access to Civil Trials After Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 286, 288–89 (1984) (“The multiplicity of views
represented in the seven separate opinions in Richmond left the newly established right of access largely
undefined.”).
148 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
149 Nowaczewski, supra note 147, at 289.
150 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 597. Chief Justice Burger was joined only by Justice Rehnquist in his
dissent. Id. Justice Stevens dissented principally on the ground that he found the Court’s decision “advisory,
hypothetical, and, at best, premature.” Id. at 620, 623 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 598 (majority opinion).
152 Id. at 598–99.
153 Id. at 598 n.1 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981), which the Court invalidated
in this same opinion).
154 Nowaczewski, supra note 147, at 291–92.
155 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 592 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[O]pen
trials are bulwarks of our free and democratic government.”).
156 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07.
157 Id. at 608 n.20.

LEVITAS GALLEYSFINAL

2009]

6/9/2010 2:49 PM

SCALING WALLER

515

Unlike Gannett and Richmond Newspapers, where the defendant’s right to
a fair trial was invoked to justify closure (successfully under the Sixth
Amendment in Gannett, and unsuccessfully under the First Amendment in
Richmond Newspapers), the trial court in Globe Newspaper relied on an
altogether different rationale for closure: the state’s desire to prevent undue
psychological harm to child victims of sexual offenses who must testify at
trial.158
While the majority agreed that these interests could certainly be
compelling, it held the Massachusetts mandatory trial closure statute
unconstitutional159 and required a case-by-case balancing of interests.160 Thus,
when making findings to support closure of the courtroom in a sex abuse trial,
the court should consider, among other things, “the minor victim’s age,
psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires
of the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives.”161 The “compelling
interest” requirement and the mandate for specific findings announced in
Globe Newspaper162 thereby laid the foundation for the four-part test
articulated in Waller. However, before deciding Waller, the Court further
refined the standard for courtroom closure under the First Amendment once
more and extended the right of public access to criminal trials to voir dire.
4. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court163 involved the closure of the
courtroom to the press and public during all but three days of a six-week voir
dire proceeding for the trial of a defendant charged with the “interracial sexual
attack and murder” of a fifteen year-old girl.164 Unlike the divided decisions in
Globe Newspaper and Richmond Newspapers, all nine Justices agreed for the
first time165 that the public right of access to criminal trials—in this case, voir
158 Id. at 600 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 401 N.E.2d 360, 369 (Mass. 1980), vacated,
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 449 U.S. 894 (1980)).
159 Id. at 602.
160 Id. at 608 n.20 (“Indeed, the plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers suggested that individualized
determinations are always required before the right of access may be denied: ‘Absent an overriding interest
articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public.’” (quoting Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581)).
161 Id. at 608 (footnote omitted).
162 Id. at 607–08.
163 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
164 Id. at 521 n.1 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
165 Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 502. Justices Blackmun and Stevens wrote
separate concurring opinions. Id. Justice Marshall wrote a special concurrence, agreeing with the judgment
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dire proceedings, which the Court held “presumptively [to have] been a public
process”166—is found in the First Amendment.167
Here, in a highly charged criminal proceeding, the trial court justified the
closure during voir dire by citing the defendant’s right to a fair trial, as well as
the right to privacy of some jurors who had “special experiences in sensitive
areas that do not appear to be appropriate for public discussion.”168 In holding
the closure unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds, the Court articulated
the framework that would become the basis for the four-part Waller test:
The presumption of openness may be overcome only [(1)] by an
overriding interest [(2)] based on findings that closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is [(3)] narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific
enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure
169
order was properly entered.

In support of its holding, the Court cited many of the same arguments
raised in Globe Newspaper and Richmond Newspapers: the historical practice
of open trials in England and Colonial America,170 as well as the “community
therapeutic value”171 of public proceedings, which “vindicate the concerns of
the victims and the community in knowing that offenders are being brought to
account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly and openly selected.”172
Justice Stevens also emphasized the structural benefit of open trials and
reiterated the argument from Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Globe
Newspaper that “the First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual
but refusing to join the opinion because he felt the majority had made “gratuitous comments concerning the
length of voir dire proceedings” and failed to appreciate the racially charged nature of the case. Id. at 521–22
(Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). Although Justice Rehnquist had filed the lone dissent in Richmond
Newspapers and joined Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Globe Newspaper—and sided with the five-member
majority in Gannett in holding that the public does not have an independent right under either the Sixth or the
Fourteenth Amendment to attend criminal trials—Justice Rehnquist voted with the majority in PressEnterprise to uphold the right of public access to criminal trials. Id. at 502 (majority opinion); see also
discussion supra Part I.C.1–3.
166 Press-Enter., 464 U.S. at 505 (majority opinion).
167 See id. at 509 n.8 (“[T]he question we address—whether the voir dire process must be open—focuses
on First . . . Amendment values and the historical backdrop against which the First Amendment was
enacted.”); id. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring).
168 Id. at 504 (majority opinion) (quoting the trial court judge) (internal quotation marks omitted).
169 Id. at 510.
170 Id. at 505 (“[A]t the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England
had long been presumptively open.” (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569
(1980) (plurality opinion))).
171 Id. at 508.
172 Id. at 509.
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citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican form of
self-government.”173
In a special concurrence, Justice Marshall reiterated the requirement that
Justice Brennan articulated in Globe Newspaper, stating that any closure must
be narrowly tailored: “[P]rior to issuing a closure order, a trial court should be
obliged to show that the order in question constitutes the least restrictive
means available for protecting compelling state interests.”174 Marshall’s
language in Press-Enterprise thus reinforced the importance of strict scrutiny,
which would be incorporated as the second element of the four-part Waller
test: Any closure must be “no broader than necessary to protect” the state’s
overriding interest justifying the closure.175
II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT PUBLIC TRIAL GUARANTEE: WALLER V. GEORGIA
AND THE RULES OF STRUCTURAL AND HARMLESS ERROR
[T]he settled rule of the federal courts [is] that a showing of
prejudice is not necessary for reversal of a conviction not had in
public proceedings.
—Levine v. United States176

Part I of this Comment discussed the origin of the public trial right, the
competing interests that courts must balance when deciding to close the
courtroom, and the Supreme Court’s rationale in establishing guidelines to
protect First Amendment interests in the event of courtroom closure. Part II
discusses how these guidelines were adopted in the context of the Sixth
Amendment public trial right in Waller v. Georgia. This Comment argues that
trial and appellate courts too often err by approving wrongful courtroom
closures, and that corrective action is needed to properly enforce the public
trial right and protect the important underlying values at stake. This Part
advances that argument by explaining why violation of the public trial right is
considered “structural error” requiring reversal, and how the doctrine of
harmless error applies to violations of some constitutional rights, especially
violations of the Public Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment.

173 Id. at 517–18 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604
(1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
174 Id. at 520 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
175 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984).
176 362 U.S. 610, 627 n.* (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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A. Waller v. Georgia and the Sixth Amendment: Violation of the Public Trial
Guarantee Is Never Harmless
In holding that “the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no
less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the
press and public,”177 Waller succinctly synthesized the Court’s prior
jurisprudence to arrive at a coherent set of rules for uniformly enforcing the
public trial right under both the First and Sixth Amendments.178 Decided by a
unanimous Court in May 1984, Waller v. Georgia ruled unconstitutional the
closure of a seven-day suppression hearing as part of the criminal trial of
thirty-seven defendants charged with illegal gambling.179 In so doing, Waller
established the process that trial courts must follow before closing a courtroom
in light of a defendant’s right to a public trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments180:
[(1)] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [(2)] the closure
must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [(3)] the
trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the
proceeding, and [(4)] it must make findings adequate to support the
181
closure.

Writing for the majority, Justice Powell182 reiterated the observation made
by constitutional scholar Thomas Cooley that “[t]he requirement of a public
trial is for the benefit of the accused.”183 Justice Powell was careful to note,
however, that the right to an open trial must be balanced against other interests,
such as the defendant’s right to a fair trial or the government’s interest in
preventing disclosure of sensitive information.184 While Justice Powell
177

Waller, 467 U.S. at 46.
As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Presley v. Georgia, a case involving the constitutionality of
courtroom closure during voir dire under the Sixth Amendment, “[t]he extent to which the First and Sixth
Amendment public trial rights are coextensive is an open question . . . . [but] there is no legitimate
reason . . . to give one who asserts a First Amendment privilege greater rights to insist on public proceedings
than the accused has.” 78 U.S.L.W. 4051, 4052 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2010) (per curiam).
179 Chandler, supra note 15, at 802–04.
180 Waller, 467 U.S. at 47 (“[U]nder the Sixth Amendment any closure of a suppression hearing over the
objections of the accused must meet the tests set out in Press-Enterprise and its predecessors.”).
181 Id. at 48 (citing Press-Enter. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 511–12 (1984)).
182 Justice Powell did not participate in the Richmond Newspapers decision, but he voted with the
majority in support of a qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal trials in both Globe Newspaper
and Press-Enterprise. See discussion supra Part I.C.3–4.
183 Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
184 Id. at 45.
178
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anticipated that courtroom closures would be rare, he cautioned that “the
balance of interests must be struck with special care.”185 Thus, under Waller,
the party seeking the closure has the burden of demonstrating the overriding
interest at stake and proving the closure is no broader than necessary.186 The
trial court must also explore reasonable alternatives and, if ordering closure,
make adequate findings in support of its decision.187 As the North Dakota
Supreme Court explained, the findings requirement is not imposed “merely to
give the reviewing court something to review,” but to demonstrate that the trial
court carefully weighed the competing interests before ordering closure.188
Waller not only gave new guidance to trial judges considering courtroom
closure, it unequivocally instructed appellate courts that they could not review
any failure to follow the four-part test using harmless error analysis.189 The
Court’s holding that “[t]he defendant should not be required to prove specific
prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation of the public-trial guarantee”
was not particularly new, however.190 The logic for holding that a defendant
need not prove he was actually harmed by excluding the public was articulated
more than a century ago by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v.
Murray.191 In that case, the defendant was charged with murdering a police
officer, and the trial judge stationed a police officer at the courtroom door with
orders to exclude all but “respectable citizens.”192 The defendant’s attorney
protested to no avail that “the talk around town is that this trial is a sort of starchamber proceeding.”193 In ordering a new trial and holding that the trial
185

Id.
Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 48).
187 Id.; see also Press-Enter., 464 U.S. at 511 (“Even with findings adequate to support closure, the trial
court’s orders denying access to voir dire testimony failed to consider whether alternatives were available to
protect the interests of the prospective jurors that the trial court’s orders sought to guard.”); Presley v. Georgia,
78 U.S.L.W. 4051, 4052 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2010) (per curiam) (“The conclusion that trial courts are required to
consider alternatives to closure . . . is clear . . . from this Court’s precedents . . . .”).
188 State v. Klem, 438 N.W.2d 798, 801 (N.D. 1989).
189 Waller, 467 U.S. at 49; see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997) (observing
that, according to Waller, violation of the public trial right is one of a “very limited class of cases” that
constitutes structural error); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (explaining that a structural
error is a “defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the
trial process itself”); Judd, 250 F.3d at 1314–15 (“[A] violation of one’s right to a public trial is structural
error. . . . [and] structural errors are not subject to harmless error analysis.” (citations omitted)).
190 Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n.9 (“‘[T]he settled rule of the federal courts [is] that a showing of prejudice is
not necessary for reversal of a conviction not had in public proceedings.’” (quoting Levine v. United States,
362 U.S. 610, 627 n.* (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting))).
191 50 N.W. 995 (Mich. 1891).
192 Id. at 996, 997.
193 Id.
186
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court’s mistake was not subject to harmless error analysis, the court announced
that it disagreed with the proposition that the defendant bears the burden of
showing actual injury when he is deprived of a public trial, stating:
[W]hen [the defendant] shows that his constitutional right has been
violated, the law conclusively presumes that he has suffered an actual
injury. I go further, and say that the whole body politic suffers an
actual injury when a constitutional safeguard erected to protect the
rights of citizens has been violated in the person of the humblest or
meanest citizen of the state. The [C]onstitution does not stop to
inquire of what the person has been accused or what crime he has
perpetrated; but it accords to all, without question, a fair, impartial,
194
and public trial.

Murray is a nineteenth century state court opinion, but the Supreme Court,
which has since developed a more detailed rationale for sorting out which
constitutional violations are subject to harmless error analysis and which are
not, has consistently treated the public trial right as non-harmless, structural
error.195 To better understand the doctrines of harmless and structural error,
and where violations of the public trial right sit within each—and to lay the
groundwork for the discussion that follows about the application of the plain
error rule to violations of Waller—it is helpful to review the modern history of
the harmless error doctrine.
B. “Impregnable Citadels of Technicality”: The Evolution of the Harmless
Error Doctrine and Its Application to Constitutional Error
The harmless error rule, codified at Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, provides that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance
that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”196 Judicial
reformers advocated the adoption of earlier versions of the rule in state and
federal courts in the early twentieth century in response to appellate courts
invoking seemingly minor technicalities to overturn lower court decisions.197

194
195
196
197

Id. at 999.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
In 1919, Congress amended section 269 of the Judiciary Code, declaring that:
On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a new trial in any case, civil
or criminal, the court shall give judgment, after an examination of the entire record before the
court, without regard to technical errors or defects or to exceptions which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.
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As noted by Justice Harlan in Chapman v. California,198 prior to the adoption
of the harmless error rule, “most American appellate courts, concerned about
the harshness of criminal penalties, followed the rule imposed on English
courts . . . and held that any error of substance required a reversal of
conviction.”199
Led by authorities such as Roscoe Pound200 and Judge Learned Hand, the
reform movement prompted courts to “discontinue using reversal as a
‘necessary’ remedy for particular errors and ‘to substitute judgment for the
automatic application of rules . . . .’”201 In Kotteakos v. United States,202 the
Supreme Court observed that the driving force behind the introduction of the
federal harmless error rule was the
widespread and deep conviction . . . . that courts of review “tower
above the trials of criminal cases as impregnable citadels of
technicality.” So great was the threat of reversal, in many
jurisdictions, that criminal trial became a game for sowing reversible
error in the record, only to have repeated the same matching of wits
203
when a new trial had been thus obtained.

Reformers agreed that a harmless error rule would restore public
confidence in the criminal trial process by focusing appellate courts “on the
underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence
of immaterial error.”204 However, disregarding harmless error without
Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEX. L. REV. 126, 147 (1927) (quoting the amended
section 269 of the Judicial Code); see also An Act to Codify, Revise, and Amend the Laws Relating to the
Judiciary, Pub. L. No. 281, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181 (1919). Sunderland also observed, “About eighteen states
have adopted similar legislation. About nine or ten states have reached the same result by judicial action.
Almost a dozen states adhere more or less closely to the technical rule of presumed prejudice.” Sunderland,
supra.
198 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
199 Id. at 48 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN
AMERICA 190 (1939).
200 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 14 AM. LAW.
445, 450 (1906) (asserting that “the worst feature of American procedure is the lavish granting of new trials,”
and contrasting the granting of new trials in American courts with the English Court of Appeal, which grants
new trials in only “about three percent of the cases reviewed”).
201 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 48–49 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing and quoting 4 BARRON, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2571 (1965)).
202 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
203 Id. at 759 (footnote omitted) (quoting Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of
Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925)); see also Johnson v. United
States, 318 U.S. 189, 202 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“To turn a criminal appeal into a quest for error
no more promotes the ends of justice than to acquiesce in low standards of criminal prosecution.”).
204 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).
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undermining important principles of justice is no simple task.
distinguished California jurist Roger J. Traynor colorfully observed:

[Vol. 59

As the

Errors are the insects in the world of law, traveling through it in
swarms, often unnoticed in their endless procession. Many are
plainly harmless; some appear ominously harmful. Some, for all the
benign appearance of their spindly traces, mark the way for a plague
205
of followers that deplete trials of fairness.

Despite the adoption of the federal harmless error rule in 1919, most
constitutional errors in the first half of the twentieth century were still seen as
affecting “the substantial rights of the parties,”206 and thus continued to be
regarded as so grave that they required automatic reversal.207 This framework
changed dramatically in 1967, however, with the landmark case of Chapman v.
California, in which the Supreme Court fashioned what it termed the
“harmless-constitutional-error rule.”208
In Chapman, the appellants had been charged with robbery, kidnapping,
and murder, but chose not to testify at trial.209 The prosecutor commented
extensively on their silence and won a conviction.210 Although implying a
defendant’s guilt from his refusal to testify was permitted under the California
constitution at the time,211 the California Supreme Court found that the
prosecutor violated Chapman’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.212
The court upheld the convictions, however, on the ground that the prosecutor’s
comments were merely harmless error.213
In their appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Chapman appellants urged
the Court to adopt a rule that “all federal constitutional errors, regardless of the
facts and circumstances, must always be deemed harmful” and thus require
205

ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR, at ix (1970).
Supra note 197.
207 Edwards, supra note 5, at 1175–76; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 42 (1967) (Stewart,
J., concurring in result) (“[I]n a long line of cases, involving a variety of constitutional claims in both state and
federal prosecutions, this Court has steadfastly rejected any notion that constitutional violations might be
disregarded on the ground that they were ‘harmless.’ Illustrations of the principle are legion.”).
208 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22; see also Gary C. Horner, Recent Cases, Constitutional Law—Harmless
Constitutional Error—Chapman v. California, 87 Sup. Ct. 824 (1967), 71 DICK. L. REV. 686 (1967).
209 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 18–19.
210 Id. at 26–42.
211 The U.S. Supreme Court later ruled this practice unconstitutional. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
615 (1965).
212 Chapman, 328 U.S. at 20.
213 People v. Teal, 404 P.2d 209, 220–21 (Cal. 1965), rev’d sub nom. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967).
206
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automatic reversal.214 The Court rejected this proposal, holding instead that
“there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular
case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may . . . be deemed
harmless, [and] not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.”215
Writing for the eight-Justice majority, Justice Black observed that review of
federal constitutional errors is a federal question216 and declared:
Whether a conviction for crime should stand when a State has failed
to accord federal constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as
much of a federal question as what particular federal constitutional
provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and whether they
have been denied. With faithfulness to the constitutional union of the
States, we cannot leave to the States the formulation of the
authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect people
217
from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed rights.

Even as the Court in Chapman significantly broadened application of the
harmless error rule to federal constitutional errors, it nevertheless recognized
that some constitutional rights are so basic to a fair trial that their violation can
never be treated as harmless error.218 Such errors invalidate the conviction of
even an obviously guilty defendant because “[w]ithout these basic protections,
a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination
of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as
fundamentally fair.”219
Arizona v. Fulminante, decided in 1991, further formalized this dichotomy,
dividing constitutional errors into two categories: trial errors and structural
errors.220 The former are subject to harmless error analysis because they
“‘occur[] during presentation of the case to the jury’ and their effect may ‘be
quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to

214

Chapman, 328 U.S. at 21–22.
Id. at 22.
216 Id. at 18, 21 (noting, also, that “[t]he application of a state harmless-error rule is . . . a state question
where it involves only errors of state procedure or state law”).
217 Id. at 21. But see id. at 46–47 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court has no “general
supervisory power over the trial of federal constitutional issues in state courts” under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
218 Id. at 23 (majority opinion).
219 Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1986) (citation omitted).
220 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–11 (1991).
215
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determine whether they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’”221 The
latter are deemed “structural defects”222 because they “affect[] the framework
within which the trial proceeds . . . [and are not] simply . . . error[s] in the trial
process itself.”223 Errors of this type are regarded as “so intrinsically harmful
as to require automatic reversal . . . without regard to their effect on the
outcome.”224 The assignment of the structural error label also rests “upon the
difficulty of assessing the effect of the error,”225 which makes a determination
of harmlessness nearly impossible, and thus improper.226 Structural errors
include: a judge entering judgment of conviction in a jury-based criminal trial
or directing “the jury to come forward with such a verdict;”227 denial of the
right to counsel;228 the unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant’s race
from the grand jury that indicted him (regardless of “overwhelming evidence
of his guilt”);229 denial of the right to trial by an impartial judge;230 and denial
of the right to a public trial.231
Under the rubric of structural error, a courtroom closure that violates
Waller is not subject to harmless error analysis because it would be extremely
difficult for a defendant to come up with evidence of specific injury resulting
from an improper closure.232 After all, if the public is excluded from the
221 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148, 149 n.4 (2006) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at
307–08) (dividing constitutional error into two comprehensive categories, “trial error” and “structural defects”
and specifically citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984), to illustrate the latter).
222 Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148.
223 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310.
224 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999).
225 Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n.4.
226 Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n.9 (“‘[Where] demonstration of prejudice . . . is a practical impossibility,
prejudice must necessarily be implied.’” (quoting State v. Sheppard, 438 A.2d 125, 128 (Conn. 1980))). The
difficulty of assessing harm is not, however, the only test. The irrelevance of harmlessness also can lead to
designation of structural error. See, e.g., McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (“Since the right
to self-representation is a right that when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome
unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to ‘harmless error’ analysis.”).
227 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 294 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that such convictions would be invalidated
“‘regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction’” (quoting United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572–73 (1977))).
228 Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692
(1984) (“Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in
prejudice. . . . Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not
worth the cost.”).
229 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 294 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)).
230 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (requiring automatic reversal when a judge with a financial
interest in the outcome of the case presides over the defendant’s criminal trial).
231 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310.
232 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (“[A] requirement that prejudice be shown ‘would in
most cases deprive [the defendant] of the [public-trial] guarantee, for it would be difficult to envisage a case in
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courtroom it is difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate how the presence of
spectators would have deterred perjury, curbed judicial abuse, or advanced the
cause of republican self-government. As the Court explained in Waller,
“[w]hile the benefits of a public trial are frequently intangible, difficult to
prove, or a matter of chance, the Framers plainly thought them nonetheless
real.”233
The strength of the rule that violation of the public trial right is always
structural error is reinforced by the fact that over the past forty years the Court
has steadily eroded the rule of reversal as applied to other constitutional
errors,234 but has not done so where violations of Waller are concerned. For
example, the Court has expanded harmless error analysis to apply to violations
of the Confrontation Clause,235 admission of coerced confessions,236 and a host
of other constitutional violations.237 Notably, the Court has done so while
repeatedly reaffirming that any violation of the public trial right still remains
structural error.238 And recently, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,239 where
the Court declared that violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of
choice is structural error, the Court cited Waller to illustrate that its
“conclusion of structural error [still rests] upon the difficulty of assessing the
effect of the error.”240
The law is clear that a violation of the public trial right can never be
assessed under the rubric of harmless error. However, as demonstrated by
which he would have evidence available of specific injury.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States ex
rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 608 (1969))).
233 Id.
234 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 652
(1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“By now it goes without saying that harmless-error review is of almost
universal application; there are few errors that may not be forgiven as harmless.”); Fulminante, 499 U.S. at
306 (“[M]ost constitutional errors can be harmless.”); Edwards, supra note 5, at 1186 (“[T]he Court’s decision
in Chapman heralded a major expansion in both the number of violations subject to harmless-error analysis
and the frequency with which that analysis is employed.”).
235 Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 250 (1969) (finding harmless error because of the
“overwhelming” evidence against the defendant when a trial judge admitted the confessions of three codefendants but two of the defendants never took the witness stand).
236 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308; see also United States v. Daniel, 932 F.2d 517, 518, 521–22 (6th Cir.
1991) (holding harmless the coerced statement of a defendant after he and others were forced to lie down on
the floor, handcuffed, with their heads covered by a sheet while police executed a search without an arrest
warrant or probable cause for the seizure because a later voluntary confession provided the same information);
Edwards, supra note 5, at 1196–97.
237 For a comprehensive list, see Edwards, supra note 5, at 1177 n.33.
238 See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
239 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
240 Id. at 149 n.4.
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Craven v. State, some appellate courts will still resort to harmless error
analysis to uphold convictions in the interest of justice for the victim, even
when it is obvious that the trial court failed to conduct a Waller inquiry.241 The
rule that improper closure mandates reversal is less obvious, however, in a case
of plain error—when a trial court violates Waller, but the defendant fails to
object.
III. APPLYING THE RULE OF PLAIN ERROR TO THE PUBLIC TRIAL GUARANTEE
To invoke the protection of structural error, a defendant should properly
object to the courtroom closure. But what rights may a defendant assert if no
objection is made? This Part explains the rule of plain error and why it should
apply to violations of Waller—an issue the Supreme Court has not yet
addressed.
It is essential to the goal of judicial economy that a party be required to
make a timely objection to the actions of the court and explain the reasons for
the objection to preserve a claim of error.242 “Failure to do so will ordinarily
bar review of [a] defendant’s claim either on a subsequent motion or on appeal,
except for plain error.”243 The plain error rule244 is a companion to the rule of
harmless error and is summarily defined as error that “affects substantial rights
[and so] may be considered [on appeal] even though it was not brought to the
trial court’s attention.”245 Given the sparse text of the rule, it is worth
examining how it has been interpreted to determine whether it applies to
violations of the public trial right when no objection is made. After all, just as
the Court has steadily expanded application of the harmless error rule to
constitutional violations, it has also announced that not all constitutional errors
are subject to plain error review.246 Furthermore, it is not enough for the error
to affect a defendant’s “substantial rights.” As the language of the rule

241 Craven v. State, 664 S.E.2d 921, 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“In this case, while the trial court erred in
removing Craven’s family from the courtroom, the error is harmless.”), cert. denied (Oct. 27, 2008). For a
review of Craven, see supra Introduction.
242 FED. R. CRIM. P. 51; see also 3B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 841–43 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing Rule 51 and related cases).
243 WRIGHT, supra note 242, at 443 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
244 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
245 Id.
246 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (“‘No procedural principle is more familiar to this
Court than that a constitutional right,’ or a right of any other sort, ‘may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil
cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.’”
(quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944))).

LEVITAS GALLEYSFINAL

2009]

6/9/2010 2:49 PM

SCALING WALLER

527

suggests, the defendant must also show that the error “seriously affect[s] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”247 As this Part
will show, the Court’s adoption of the “fairness, integrity or public reputation”
element of the plain error test lends further weight to the argument that
violations of the public trial right must be subject to plain error review.
Decided in 1993, United States v. Olano established a four-part test for
federal appellate courts to determine whether an error without objection is
worthy of plain error review248: First, there must be error—the violation of a
legal rule that was not waived, despite the defendant’s failure to object.249
Second, the error must be “plain.”250 Third, it must have affected substantial
rights.251 And fourth, despite the discretionary character of the plain error
rule,252 appellate courts “should correct a plain, forfeited error affecting
substantial rights if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.’”253
What is the relationship between harmless error and plain error? If the
Court has held that an error violates a defendant’s “substantial rights” and
therefore is not harmless under Rule 52(a), does the error satisfy the
“substantial rights” component of the plain error test of 52(b)? The answer is
yes,254 although under the plain error rule “[i]t is the defendant rather than the
Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to [proving]
prejudice.”255
The plain error rule demands a remedy for an improper courtroom closure,
even when no objection was made. As previously discussed, the Court has
247 Olano, 507 U.S at 736 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160
(1936)).
248 Id. at 732–37; see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997).
249 Olano, 507 U.S. at 733–34 (“Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to
make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right.’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938))).
250 Id. at 734 (defining “plain” to mean “‘clear’ or, equivalently, ‘obvious’”).
251 Id. at 734–35.
252 Id. at 735.
253 Id. at 736 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157,
160 (1936)).
254 Id. at 744 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The phrase ‘substantial rights’ appears twice in Rule 52: once in
Rule 52(a), which describes the harmless-error rule, and again in Rule 52(b), in connection with the plain-error
rule. Presumably, the words have the same meaning each time they are used.” (citation omitted)); see also
WRIGHT, supra note 242, at 498 (“This is the same language that is used in defining ‘harmless error’ in Rule
52(a), and the same kind of inquiry is called for under each branch of Rule 52 . . . .”).
255 Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.
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adopted a per se rule of structural error for violations of the public trial right.256
If a courtroom is closed in violation of the requirements of Waller, prejudice is
automatically presumed—the error is deemed structural, not harmless—and a
violation of substantial rights has occurred. Under this logic, the defendant has
no “burden” to shoulder, and the burden-shifting element of the plain error rule
is irrelevant. The Supreme Court has not decided whether the plain error rule
applies to a violation of Waller when the defendant fails to object, but in
Johnson v. United States, a leading case discussing the plain error rule, the
Court explicitly cites Waller to illustrate that the rule applies to the “very
limited class of cases” where there is structural error, thus implicating
substantial rights.257 Dicta aside, a bona fide structural error harms substantial
rights, and thus will automatically pass the third element of the four-part test of
Rule 52(b), enumerated above.
If an improper courtroom closure meets the first three parts of the plain
error test—it is (1) error that has not been waived, (2) which is “plain,” and (3)
has affected substantial rights—the next question is whether the error affects
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding.258 If it does, is
reversal then required under the plain error rule?259 Here, the answer must also
be yes, because a violation of the public trial right directly impacts the fairness,
integrity, and public reputation of a criminal trial. The Court has yet to decide
this question, but according to prior opinions of the Court, an inseparable
relationship exists between violations of the public trial right and these
concerns. After all, if the “searchlight” of a public trial “serves as a restraint
against the abuse of judicial power,”260 then extinguishing it through an
improper closure surely threatens to erode the integrity and public reputation of
the trial.
In overturning the secret conviction of the defendant in In re Oliver, the
Court observed that public trials are important because “[t]he spectators learn

256

See discussion supra Part II.A.
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997) (noting the existence of a limited class of
cases, such as Waller, where the errors involved do affect substantial rights); see also United States v.
Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 74 (2004) (“Except for certain structural errors undermining the criminal
proceeding’s fairness as a whole, relief for [plain] error is tied to prejudicial effect . . . .”); Deborah S. Nall,
Comment, United States v. Booker: The Presumption of Prejudice in Plain Error Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 621, 632 n.86 (2006) (identifying violations of Waller as structural error that therefore meet the third
prong of the four-part test of the plain error rule).
258 Olano, 507 U.S. at 736.
259 Id.
260 United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606 (3d Cir. 1969).
257
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about their government and acquire confidence in their judicial remedies.”261
It would follow, then, that confidence—and with it, the public reputation of the
courts—would suffer absent that opportunity. Discouraging perjury by
enabling persons with knowledge of the facts to attend a trial and possibly
deliver relevant testimony is essential to the fairness of any criminal
proceeding.262 Likewise, in both In re Oliver and Waller, the Court
incorporated the public trial right under the Fourteenth Amendment, using a
test based on fairness principles.263 Thus, the fourth prong of the plain error
test is satisfied because an improper closure clearly affects “the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”264
Additionally, it should be noted that some commentators have observed
that the four-part framework for assessing plain error adopted in Olano deemphasized the “miscarriage of justice standard”265—which stressed reversals
only to avoid the conviction of an innocent defendant—in favor of a standard
where “courts rather than counsel are entrusted with insuring the fairness,
integrity, and public reputation of the judicial process.”266 As Justice
O’Connor’s majority opinion explained, a plain error may warrant reversal
regardless of the guilt or innocence of the defendant because of the error’s
effect on the fairness of the trial.267 Additionally, as argued above, violations
of the public trial right especially implicate the fairness, integrity, and public
reputation of criminal proceedings. Any further emphasis on these factors
created by the holding in Olano thus lends even greater weight to finding plain
error when courtroom exclusions are improper and the defendant fails to object
without conscious waiver.
In many cases, improper courtroom closures can be easily distinguished
from those constitutional violations that are harmless error and not covered by
the plain error rule. The determination of plain error in most cases depends on
a showing of prejudice,268 and if the constitutional error is one that the
261 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948) (citing 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834 (3d
ed. 1940)).
262 See discussion supra note 60.
263 See discussion supra Parts I.A.1, II.A.
264 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993).
265 Jeffrey L. Lowry, Plain Error Rule—Clarifying Plain Error Analysis Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1065, 1084 (1994); see also Edwards, supra note
5, at 1185, 1203–04.
266 Lowry, supra note 265, at 1081.
267 Olano, 507 U.S. at 736; see also Lowry, supra note 265, at 1073.
268 See WRIGHT, supra note 242, at 501 (“In most claims of plain error, the outcome turns on whether or
not prejudice can be demonstrated.”).
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Supreme Court considers harmless,269 then the plain error rule will not apply.
However, because violations of Waller are per se structural errors, it is easy to
see how they fall within the ambit of plain error. This is only true provided
that the Waller violation is deemed to meet the fourth element of the plain
error test, as this Comment argues. As for other structural constitutional errors,
whether the plain error rule applies will also rest on an assessment under the
fourth prong of the plain error test.
Thus, a courtroom closure that violates Waller, and that is neither objected
nor consented to, is almost sure to meet the plain error test and require reversal
because (1) a legal rule has been violated without waiver; (2) such errors are
certainly obvious; (3) violations of Waller are structural errors and clearly
implicate substantial rights; and (4) such violations “necessarily render a trial
fundamentally unfair.”270 Furthermore, the error at issue represents just the
kind of defect that seriously impacts the “integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings,” thus meeting the requirements of Olano.271
However, as demonstrated by Craven v. State, discussed in the
Introduction, it is difficult to persuade appellate courts to invoke the rule of
plain error in child sex abuse cases where evidence of guilt is substantial.272 In
Craven, the Georgia Court of Appeals not only applied harmless error to
uphold the closure at issue, but it also announced that Craven had waived any
constitutional claim he might have had because he did not object to the
exclusion of his relatives from the courtroom until after his stepdaughter had
testified.273
Georgia courts are not alone in failing to apply plain error review to
violations of Waller. In People v. Priola, the defendant was convicted in
Illinois state court of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of an eight-year-old
girl.274 The courtroom was closed during the victim’s testimony, but the
defendant failed to object. The closure violated Waller and also was later
deemed illegal under Illinois law.275 Although the Illinois Court of Appeals

269

For discussions of Chapman and Fulminante, see supra Part II.B.
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986).
271 Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
272 For a summary of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt, see supra note 22.
273 Craven v. State, 664 S.E.2d 921, 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); see also supra notes 25–27 and
accompanying text.
274 561 N.E.2d 82, 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
275 Id. at 96.
270
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found that the trial court failed to make findings of fact or consider alternatives
before closing the courtroom, it declined to apply plain error,276 saying that the
evidence against the defendant was not “closely balanced,” and the error was
not serious enough to deprive him of a fair trial.277
This decision may have achieved justice for the victim, but it ignored the
constitutional requirements of Waller and did not properly apply the plain error
rule. The Waller violation was structural error, so any inquiry into the
“balance” of the evidence was inappropriately akin to harmless error
analysis278 and should not have been part of the court’s plain error inquiry.
Addressing the issue of fairness under its plain error inquiry, the court simply
announced that because “most of the trial was open to the public and the media
was not excluded from any portion of the trial,” the plain error rule did not
apply.279 However, if one of the goals of a public trial is to encourage
witnesses to come forward and to discourage perjury (as even the Illinois Court
of Appeals acknowledged),280 any improper closure has the potential to
undermine these goals because it is impossible to know how the exclusion of
unknown persons may have impacted the proceeding. It is exactly this
uncertainty that led the Supreme Court to declare that violations of Waller
always constitute structural error. The same logic also suggests that such errors
sufficiently implicate the fairness and integrity of the trial to justify applying
plain error, even if it is impossible to know exactly how the improper closure
may have affected any particular case.281
Another example of a state court’s failure to apply the plain error rule can
be found in State v. Smith, where the defendant was accused of multiple sexual
offenses involving his daughter, a minor.282 The trial judge closed the
courtroom in response to the prosecutor’s request under North Carolina law,
and the defendant contended that the trial court failed to make findings of fact
prior to the closure.283 However, because the judge “spent ample time
276

Id.
Id. at 96–98.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 97.
280 Id.
281 See Watters v. State, 612 A.2d 1288, 1292–93 (Md. 1992) (‘“Indeed, the barring of spectators would
make it impossible for the unknown individual to stray into the courtroom and reveal his information bearing
on the case. To require proof of this by the defendant would be ironically to enforce against him the necessity
to prove what the disregard of his constitutional right has made it impossible for him to learn.”’ (quoting
United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 608 (3d Cir. 1969))).
282 636 S.E.2d 267, 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
283 Id. at 275.
277
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questioning people who were in the courtroom [about] specifically why they
were there” before ordering the closure, and because the defendant’s lawyer
“had an opportunity to object to or comment on the clearing of the courtroom”
but failed to do so, the appellate court deemed the defendant had consented to
clearing the courtroom.284 Thus, according to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, no findings were required and no constitutional error occurred.285
As in Priola, the court here seemed reluctant to order a new trial because
doing so would be unfair to the victim in light of the significant evidence of the
defendant’s guilt.286 But guilty defendants are still entitled to a full application
of the plain error rule, and manufacturing “consent” to extinguish a
constitutional claim hardly contributes to the fairness, integrity, and public
reputation of a criminal trial, even if the goal is to achieve the “right result” in
any particular case. As Justice Felix Frankfurter once observed, “it is an abuse
to deal too casually and too lightly with rights guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution, even though they . . . may be invoked by those morally
unworthy.”287
IV. A PARADE OF ERRORS: THE FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE PUBLIC TRIAL
RIGHT
The previous Part argued for application of the plain error rule to violations
of Waller and described how some courts resist reversing convictions in spite
of improper courtroom closures and how they sometimes manufacture
“consent” by the defendant to avoid invoking plain error. This Part examines
other key errors committed by trial and appellate courts when they fail to
follow or enforce Waller, among them: (1) employing post hoc rationales to
justify closure when trial courts neglect to make the requisite findings; (2)
either failing to properly balance the interests at stake or applying a doctrine of
“partial closure” to suggest that a lesser “substantial interest” is required to
justify closure instead of the “overriding interest” mandated by Waller; (3)
asserting that state trial closure statutes provide a sufficient proxy for the
Waller test; (4) holding that failure to follow the state trial closure statute is

284

Id.
Id.
286 See id. at 270 (detailing testimony by the victim about multiple incidents of abuse and attempted abuse
by the defendant, as well as corroborating statements made by the victim to her former minister and to a child
protective service worker).
287 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498 (1953).
285
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irrelevant because the law is “for the benefit of the victim;” and (5) simply
disregarding the requirements of Waller altogether.
A. Employing Post Hoc Rationales to Justify Closure
Courts often employ post hoc rationales justifying closure despite the plain
language of Waller that forbids it.288 In State v. Anderson, a criminal sexual
misconduct case involving a five-year-old victim, a Minnesota trial court
ordered the courtroom closed during a hearing in chambers with counsel
present, but the exchange “was not recorded, and the court ha[d] no clear
memory of the discussion.”289
Despite the state court of appeals’s
acknowledgement that a trial court must “articulate its findings with specificity
and detail supporting the need for closure,” it found no error because the
prosecuting attorney’s post hoc recollections included “many but possibly not
all of [the] reasons” that had originally been articulated in favor of closure,
even though the defendant’s lawyer disagreed.290
In United States v. Farmer, the Eighth Circuit held that “specific findings
by the district court are not necessary if we can glean sufficient support for a
partial temporary closure from the record.”291 And in Bowden v. Keane, the
Second Circuit echoed this sentiment when it announced that “Waller’s fourth
prong is satisfied when ‘information’ that supports the closure can be
‘gleaned’ . . . from the record developed by the trial court.”292 It is difficult to
see how these holdings square with the strong language of Waller, which
explicitly rejects post hoc findings,293 and the mandate of Globe Newspaper
and Richmond Newspapers for individualized determinations articulated in
findings prior to closure.294 However, in the absence of corrective guidance by
the Supreme Court, post hoc findings are likely to remain attractive to
appellate courts in some cases, especially those involving child victims where
evidence of the defendant’s guilt seems overwhelming.

288 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.8 (1984) (“The post hoc assertion by the Georgia Supreme Court
that the trial court balanced petitioners’ right to a public hearing against the privacy rights of others cannot
satisfy the deficiencies in the trial court’s record. . . . and is itself too broad to meet the Press-Enterprise
standard.”); see also State v. Klem, 438 N.W.2d 798, 802 (N.D. 1989).
289 State v. Anderson, No. C9-96-1016, 1996 WL 665902, at *1–2 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1996).
290 Id. at *2.
291 32 F.3d 369, 371 (8th Cir. 1994).
292 237 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2001).
293 Carter v. State, 738 A.2d 871, 878 (Md. 1999) (“An appellate court may not provide a post hoc
rationale for why the trial judge would have closed the trial had it held a hearing and made findings.”).
294 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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B. Balancing of Interests and the Partial Closure Doctrine
Although Waller clearly mandates a balancing of interests, trial courts often
do a poor job of following the rule. In People v. Holveck, for example, the
defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting three five-year-old girls, and
the victims testified in a closed courtroom.295 Citing Waller, the Illinois Court
of Appeals held that the trial court had failed to engage “in the careful
balancing of interests and the individualized evaluation of factors required”
because the “sole reason cited by the court for the closure was the ‘unnerving
effect’ on the children if the courtroom were crowded and wanting to make the
unpleasant experience of testifying as pleasant as possible” for the child
witnesses.296 It is not that courts should be unsympathetic to these concerns.
After all, Globe Newspaper explicitly acknowledged that “safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of a minor was a compelling interest
which could support closure . . . .”297 However, such a determination must be
made by trial courts on a case-by-case basis, and individualized determinations
articulated in the findings are always required.298 It follows that if such
findings are not made before excluding the public from the courtroom, the trial
court may not rationalize its decision after the fact.
In Woods v. Kuhlmann, the Second Circuit joined the Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits in distinguishing between “partial” and “total” closure of the
courtroom to justify a less demanding application of Waller.299 In a partial

295

524 N.E.2d 1073, 1075–76, 1083 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
Id. at 1083. But see LaPlante v. Crosby, 133 F. App’x 723, 725–26 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
prosecutor’s stated concern that “the child [could] testify in relative calm” satisfied the first prong of the
Waller test because “the physical and psychological well-being of a minor” is a compelling interest justifying
closure during a rape trial of a minor (alteration in original) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457
U.S. 596, 607 (1982))).
297 Holveck, 524 N.E.2d at 1082 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607–08).
298 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 581 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a
criminal case must be open to the public.” (emphasis added)).
299 Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1992); see, e.g., Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 753–
54 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding there was no violation of defendant’s public trial right because the trial judge
“had a substantial reason for the closure,” which the court deemed “partial”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 957
(1989); United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1356–57 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding only a substantial—not
compelling—reason was required in the context of “partial closure” when only defendants’ families were
excluded during testimony of the rape victim, a minor, who “was frightened and apprehensive of speaking
before defendants’ family members”); Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 532–33 (11th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam) (finding that the impact of partial closure was not the same as total closure, and therefore “only a
‘substantial’ rather than ‘compelling’ reason for the closure was necessary”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208
(1985).
296
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closure, for example, only members of the defendant’s family might be
excluded from the courtroom during the testimony of a single witness.300 In a
total closure, supposedly exemplified by Waller, “all persons other than
witnesses, court personnel, the parties and their lawyers [are] excluded for the
duration of the hearing.”301 In the former instance, these circuits hold that only
a less stringent “substantial reason” is needed to justify partial closure, not the
overriding interest required by Waller.302 Yet, “the Supreme Court has never
set forth a less rigorous standard for partial closures”303 and this approach also
has been criticized by other courts. In People v. Jones, the Court of Appeals of
New York flatly noted: “We are aware that some courts have recognized that a
less demanding standard can be applied to limited closure requests . . . . We
disagree.”304
There is also a problem with semantics because different courts define
“partial closure” differently. As the Eleventh Circuit observed in Judd v.
Haley, “partial closures” are defined as those “in which the public retains some
(though not complete) access to a particular proceeding.”305 However, the
court also observed that “[n]owhere does our precedent suggest that the total
closure of a courtroom for a temporary period can be considered a partial
closure, and analyzed as such.”306 Despite this admonition, state courts in the
Eleventh Circuit have insisted on doing just that.307
Labeling a closure “partial” instead of “total” makes it easier to close the
courtroom according to some courts because only a “substantial”—and not an
“overriding”—interest is then required to justify the exclusion of the public.308
However, a different issue arises altogether when courts hold that partial
closure does not require compliance with Waller at all. It is one thing to bend

300 Woods, 977 F.2d at 74–76 (members of the defendant’s family were excluded from the courtroom after
the victim-witness expressed concern for her safety, although members of the general public were allowed to
remain, hence the court deemed the closure only “partial”).
301 Id. at 76.
302 Id.
303 Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 168 n.11 (4th Cir. 2000).
304 People v. Jones, 750 N.E.2d 524, 529 (N.Y. 2001) (citations omitted).
305 Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1315 (11th Cir. 2001).
306 Id.
307 See discussion of Goldstein v. State, 640 S.E.2d 599 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006), infra notes 319–20 and
accompanying text.
308 See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 602 S.E.2d 312, 315 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (“[W]hen access to the courtroom is
retained by some spectators (such as representatives of the press or the defendant’s family members), we have
found that the impact of the closure is not as great, and not as deserving of such a rigorous level of
constitutional scrutiny.” (citing Judd, 250 F.3d at 1315)).
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the rules by lowering the threshold of interest required to meet the first part of
the Waller test, but it is quite another to distinguish between partial and total
closure in order to justify holding no hearing, making no findings of fact, and
exploring no alternatives. Yet this is what some courts have done. This
dynamic is usually seen in the context of courtroom closure pursuant to state
mandatory trial closure statutes, as explained below.
C. State Trial Closure Statutes as a Proxy for the Waller Test
Although the Supreme Court declared Massachusetts’s mandatory trial
closure statute unconstitutional in Globe Newspaper in 1992,309 it listed other
state statutes, such as Florida’s trial closure law,310 which required exclusion of
the general public but not the press during testimony of minor victims in sex
abuse cases,311 but declined to address their constitutionality. Today, Georgia
is the only state with a mandatory closure statute nearly identical to
Florida’s.312 As of March 2002, fourteen other states and the U.S. Code313
permitted or required such exclusions to varying degrees.314 Although the
Supreme Court has not considered the constitutionality of a state trial closure
law since Globe Newspaper, state courts have invalidated them on Sixth
Amendment grounds;315 upheld but construed them as requiring the application

309

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
FLA. STAT. § 918.16 (1979) (“In the trial of any case, civil or criminal, when any person under the age
of 16 is testifying concerning any sex offense, the court shall clear the courtroom of all persons except parties
to the cause and their immediate families or guardians, attorneys and their secretaries, officers of the court,
jurors, newspaper reporters or broadcasters, and court reporters.”).
311 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S at 608 n.22.
312 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-54 (2009) (“In the trial of any criminal case, when any person under
the age of 16 is testifying concerning any sex offense, the court shall clear the courtroom of all persons except
parties to the cause and their immediate families or guardians, attorneys and their secretaries, officers of the
court, jurors, newspaper reporters or broadcasters, and court reporters.”), with FLA. STAT. § 918.16(2) (2009)
(“[I]n the trial of any case, civil or criminal, when any person under the age of 16 . . . is testifying concerning
any sex offense, the court shall clear the courtroom of all persons except parties to the cause and their
immediate families or guardians, attorneys and their secretaries, officers of the court, jurors, newspaper
reporters or broadcasters, court reporters, and, at the request of the victim, victim or witness advocates
designated by the state attorney’s office.”). Other state statutes with mandatory closure language, such as
Massachusetts’s trial closure law, have been construed to require a case-by-case determination whether
“‘closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim.’” Commonwealth v. Martin, 629 N.E.2d 297,
302 (Mass. 1994) (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S at 608); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16A.
313 18 U.S.C. § 3509(e) (2006).
314 AM. PROSECUTOR RESEARCH INST., supra note 113, at 459–62.
315 See Renkel v. State, 807 P.2d 1087, 1088, 1092–93 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (declaring unconstitutional
a state mandatory trial closure law “indistinguishable from the Massachusetts mandatory closure statute” that
the Court found unconstitutional in Globe Newspaper).
310
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of Waller;316 reversed convictions where trial courts have failed to apply the
Waller test;317 or held them to be proxies for the inquiry mandated by Waller,
thereby relieving trial courts of the obligation to make case-by-case findings.318
This latter class of cases is the approach that most erodes Waller.
In Goldstein v. State, the Georgia Court of Appeals found no error in what
it termed a “temporary partial closure” during the testimony of a child
molestation victim when the courtroom was cleared of all members of the
public while experts for the State and the defense were allowed to remain.319
No hearing was held and no findings were made, yet the court of appeals
affirmed the closure as proper because Georgia’s trial closure statute was
“based upon a legislative determination that there is a compelling state interest
in protecting children while they are testifying concerning a sex offense,” and,
therefore, partial closure under Georgia law does not violate a defendant’s
public trial right.320
Georgia is not alone. Some Florida appellate courts have also held that the
entire four-part test of Waller is not required when “partial closure” is ordered
pursuant to that state’s mandatory trial closure statute.321 In Clements v. State,

316 See State v. Guajardo, 605 A.2d 217, 219 (N.H. 1992) (holding that section 632-A:8 of the New
Hampshire Revised Statutes, which mandates in camera testimony of a sex abuse victim under sixteen unless
good cause is shown by the defendant, must be construed in light of the Sixth Amendment and Waller’s fourpart test); State v. Robinson, No. COA07-1274, 2008 WL 2967706, at *1, *3 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2008)
(“In reaching a determination to close the courtroom under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-166, the court may not rely
solely on the statute but must consider the [four] Waller factors.”); State ex rel. Stevens v. Cir. Ct., 414
N.W.2d 832, 838–39 (Wis. 1987) (holding mandatory trial closure provision unconstitutional, but adopting the
“requirements established in Waller” to sustain the remaining discretionary closure provision of the Wisconsin
law).
317 See People v. Holveck, 524 N.E.2d 1073, 1082–83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (finding state statutory scheme
unconstitutional as applied because the trial court failed to “engage[] in the careful balancing of interests and
the individualized evaluation of factors required to override the defendant’s qualified Sixth Amendment right
to a public trial”).
318 See, e.g., Clements v. State, 742 So. 2d 338, 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.-5th 1999), dismissed per curiam,
jurisdiction improvidently granted, 782 So. 2d 868 (2001) (holding that partial closure during child victim
testimony in a sex offense prosecution did not require the four-factor Waller inquiry because the state
legislature, in enacting the trial closure statute, found there is a compelling interest in protecting minor
victims).
319 Goldstein v. State, 640 S.E.2d 599, 601–02 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). Goldstein’s conviction was reversed
on other grounds. Id. at 604–06.
320 Id. at 602 (citation omitted); see also supra Part IV.D.
321 Clements, 742 So. 2d at 341. Contra Thornton v. State, 585 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.-2d 1991)
(per curiam) (holding as improper the failure to apply Waller prerequisites before closing the courtroom to
even those persons authorized under state law to be present during testimony of a minor victim in a sex offense
prosecution); Pritchett v. State, 566 So. 2d 6, 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.-2d 1990) (holding state trial closure statute
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one Florida district court of appeal invoked the distinction between partial and
total closure and then explained that the state legislature, by enacting the
statute, had already made the necessary finding of compelling interest and
drafted the statute narrowly to protect defendants’ rights.322 In addition, the
court found that “the press, as the eyes and ears of the public, is allowed to
remain [and thus] . . . preserves a defendant’s constitutional right to a public
trial.”323 Therefore, no Waller inquiry was required.324
This reasoning fails on several fronts. First, even those federal circuits that
have announced a lower threshold of interest in cases of partial closure still
require compliance with all the other procedural requirements of Waller.325
Second, the argument that a state statute can be a substitute for the kind of
particularized findings required by Waller is plainly wrong. Nearly thirty
years ago in Richmond Newspapers, the Court announced that no closure was
proper without the articulation of an overriding interest in “evidentiary
findings.”326 In Press-Enterprise, the Court said these findings must be
“specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure
order was properly entered.”327 If a post hoc inquiry is too broad to provide
the record needed to “balance[] petitioners’ right to a public hearing against the
privacy rights of others,”328 then it can hardly be said that a preemptive
legislative determination devoid of specifics and divorced from the facts of any
particular case can satisfy the demands of Waller. Indeed, it is hard to imagine
how the holding in Clements can be sustained in light of Globe Newspaper,
which invalidated the Massachusetts mandatory trial closure law exactly
because the statute trumped a case-by-case inquiry.329 Finally, where it has

unconstitutional as applied when the trial court cleared the courtroom pursuant to state law in a sex offense
case without making findings to justify closure).
322 Clements, 742 So. 2d at 341. Clements was yet another sex-crime case. The defendant was convicted
of seven counts of sexual battery on a child under twelve and three counts of lewd acts upon a child. Id. at
339.
323 Id. at 341–42.
324 Id. at 341.
325 See, e.g., United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1358–59 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the three
procedural requirements of Waller still must be met in the context of partial closure: the court must hold a
hearing, make factual findings to support it, and consider reasonable alternatives); see also Douglas v.
Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 532, 533 n.2 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that courtroom closures, whether “total” or
“partial,” still burden a defendant’s constitutional rights and require that the trial court hold a hearing and
articulate specific findings before undertaking either).
326 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 560, 581 (1980).
327 Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
328 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.8 (1984).
329 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 608 n.20 (1982).
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often been said that the purpose of a public trial is to discourage perjury and to
encourage witnesses to come forward,330 the press is poorly suited to act as a
proxy for an interested person who may have specific knowledge of the case or
whose presence in the courtroom might enhance testimonial trustworthiness.
D. The Benefit-of-the-Victim Doctrine
Closing the courtroom pursuant to state law to protect the psychological
integrity of a child who is a victim-witness in a sex crime prosecution is
certainly permitted.331 However, courts must not exclude the public without
first conducting a Waller inquiry. The tendency to sidestep Waller can also
surface when the courtroom closure that is ordered goes beyond the parameters
of the statute and wrongly excludes the press or family members of the
defendant. Although the statutory error may be obvious, some appellate courts
have still upheld the closures, reasoning that because the state statute was
enacted for the benefit of the victim, the statutory error was “harmless,” or
simply did not impact the defendant’s rights.332
In Turner v. State, the defendant was convicted of molesting his
granddaughter, a child, and appealed.333 Turner cited numerous errors,
including ineffectiveness of counsel, for failure to object to the trial court’s
clearing of the courtroom of his immediate family during the victim’s
testimony.334 Turner alleged a violation of the state statute, not the U.S.
Constitution, but the response of the Georgia Court of Appeals illustrates the
flawed rationale that is sometimes employed when courtrooms are closed
pursuant to victim-witness protection statutes. Here the courtroom was closed
under section 17-8-54 of the Georgia Code, which mandates exclusion of a
range of persons but not the “immediate families” of the parties.335
As the Supreme Court announced in In re Oliver, the public trial right is
especially impacted when family members of the accused are excluded from a
criminal proceeding.336 According to Turner, the trial court committed
statutory error when it excluded his family members.337 The court of appeals
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337

Waller, 467 U.S. at 46.
Globe Newspaper, 57 U.S. at 608.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
536 S.E.2d 814, 816 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 816, 818.
See GA. CODE ANN. §17-8-54 (2009).
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271–72 (1948); see also supra note 24.
Turner, 536 S.E.2d at 818.
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countered by announcing that because the purpose of the trial closure statute
“is to protect the interest of the child witness, not the defendant,” any failure to
follow the law did not violate Turner’s rights.338 However, as held by Globe
Newspaper, Press-Enterprise, and Waller, protecting the interest of the victimwitness must be balanced against other interests, including the First
Amendment interests of the press and the public and the Sixth Amendment
interests of the defendant.339 Georgia’s trial closure statute is partially
insulated from constitutional infirmity because, while it mandates closure in a
criminal sex offense case involving testimony of a minor victim, it does not
require exclusion of “parties to the cause and their immediate families
or . . . newspaper reporters or broadcasters, and court reporters.”340 However,
as construed by the Georgia Court of Appeals in cases such as Turner and
Craven (where family members of the defendant were excluded from the
courtroom in violation of section 17-8-54 and without a Waller inquiry to
weigh the defendant’s interest), the trial closure statute is susceptible to
constitutional challenge. This is not only because the statute mandates closure
and thereby prevents a balancing of interests, but especially because Georgia
courts, unlike those in other states with similar laws, have failed to interpret the
measure to require a Waller inquiry.341 Thus, by invoking the benefit-of-thevictim doctrine in the face of statutory errors like those committed in Turner
and Craven, the Georgia Court of Appeals has made section 17-8-54 of the
Georgia Code even more vulnerable to constitutional attack.
This vulnerability is heightened by the court of appeals’s holding that the
Georgia law can act as a proxy for the individualized findings and case-by-case
inquiry required by Waller.342 Therefore, as currently construed under Georgia
law, no Waller inquiry is required when a courtroom is closed pursuant to
section 17-8-54. Yet, even if the statute is violated and a total exclusion is
ordered, the error would ostensibly be excused under the benefit-of-the-victim
doctrine, regardless of the obvious requirement under Waller to weigh the
interests of the public and the defendant. Whether this legal reasoning is as
untenable as it is incorrect will be for a higher court to decide.

338
339
340
341
342

Id.
See supra Part I.C.3–4; notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-54 (2009).
See supra notes 315–17 and accompanying text.
Craven v. State, 664 S.E.2d 921, 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied (Oct. 27, 2008).
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E. Presley v. State: An Overarching Failure to Follow Waller
While many of the cases discussed in this Comment illustrate more than
one aspect of the failure by courts to properly follow Waller, Presley v. State,
which was decided by the Georgia Supreme Court in March 2009 but
overturned 7–2 in a per curiam opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court in January
2010, perhaps best demonstrates the tendency of some courts to abrogate the
procedural requirements of Waller altogether.343 In Presley, a routine drug
trafficking case, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld a total courtroom closure
during voir dire, including the exclusion of a relative of the defendant.344 In
that case, the trial judge closed the courtroom on her own initiative and over
the objection of the defendant, ordering the defendant’s uncle to wait outside
during jury selection, explaining that he could not “sit and intermingle with
members of the jury panel.”345 Thus, in addition to implicating the public’s
First Amendment interest in attending voir dire proceedings, the closure also
disregarded the concern that has been expressed by courts regarding the
exclusion of family members of a defendant.346
When Presley’s lawyer objected, the judge announced that the courtroom
was too small to accommodate both the prospective jurors and the public.347
This reason is unconvincing, though, as the record included photographs
showing that space considerations did not justify the closure.348 Beyond

343 Presley v. State, 674 S.E.2d 909 (Ga. 2009), rev’d per curiam, 78 U.S.L.W. 4051 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2010);
see also Alyson M. Palmer, Justices Make Fast Work of Ga. Cases, DAILY REP. (Fulton County, Ga.), Jan. 20,
2010, at 1.
344 Presley, 674 S.E.2d 909. Presiding Justice Carol W. Hunstein joined Chief Justice Leah Ward Sears in
dissent. Id. at 912; see also Alyson M. Palmer, High Court OKs Closed Courtroom: DeKalb Judge Said There
Wasn’t Enough Space in Courtroom for Both Spectators and Potential Jurors, DAILY REP. (Fulton County,
Ga.), Mar. 24, 2009, at 1; Daniel Levitas, Op-Ed., Been There, Done That: Georgia Supreme Court Errs in
Upholding Courtroom Closure that Violates the Right to Public Trial, DAILY REP. (Fulton County, Ga.), Apr.
8, 2009, at 4.
345 Presley, 674 S.E.2d at 910. When the trial judge initially singled out the defendant’s uncle for
exclusion, she did not recognize that he was a relative. However, after she identified him as a family member
of the defendant, the judge still ordered his exclusion. Defense counsel responded by objecting and asking
whether “some accommodation could not be made for both, some of those members of the family and the
jurors.” The judge denied the request. Id.; see also Palmer, supra note 344.
346 See discussion supra note 24 (noting the particular interest of defendants in having their friends and
family members present in the courtroom).
347 Presley, 674 S.E.2d at 910; Palmer, supra note 344.
348 Presley, 674 S.E.2d at 912 (Sears, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is clear from the pictures in the record that
complete closure . . . was not required by space considerations, nor was the closure prompted by specific
conduct by any of the spectators in the courtroom.”); see also Presley v. Georgia, 78 U.S.L.W. 4051, 4051
(U.S. Jan. 19, 2010) (“At a hearing on the motion [for a new trial], Presley presented evidence showing that 14
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simply closing the courtroom she also ordered family members of defendants
to leave the sixth floor of the courthouse entirely. “That applies to everybody
who’s got a case,” the judge declared, announcing her presumption that anyone
affiliated with a defendant might taint the jury pool by interacting with
prospective jurors in the hallway as well as inside the courtroom.349
Subsequent proceedings revealed that this may have been standard operating
procedure for the trial judge who, during the motion for a new trial, declared
that “other judges ‘may have different policies, but I don’t permit family
members or witnesses for the State or either side to intermingle or sit on the
rows with the jurors.’”350
Although the trial judge held no hearing and made no findings of fact
necessary to establish the overriding interest she supposedly sought to protect
by closing the courtroom, the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the closure
under an abuse of discretion standard.351 This illustrates the tendency of
appellate courts to ignore the cardinal rule laid down by the Supreme Court—
that harmless error analysis should never be applied to violations of Waller.
Nevertheless, the Georgia Supreme Court erroneously affirmed, 5–2, holding
that “the trial court certainly had an overriding interest in ensuring that
potential jurors heard no inherently prejudicial remarks from observers during
voir dire.”352 The U.S. Supreme Court forcefully disagreed, finding that the
affirmance by the Georgia justices “contravened . . . clear precedents.”353
Applying the trial judge’s logic—and the rationale of the Georgia Supreme
Court—a trial judge could order that voir dire always be conducted privately
with jurors isolated in a closed courtroom in order to guard against the remote
possibility that a stray remark might taint the panel.354 The U.S. Supreme
Court found this logic wholly unsupportable:
prospective jurors could have fit in the jury box and the remaining 28 could have fit entirely on one side of the
courtroom, leaving adequate room for the public.”).
349 Id.
350 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 5, Presley v. State, 674 S.E.2d 909 (Ga. 2009) (No. S08G1152)
(quoting Transcript of Motion for New Trial at 60, State v. Presley, No. 04-CR-2574-8 (Ga. Super. Ct. May 4,
2007)).
351 Presley, 78 U.S.L.W. at 4051 (citing Presley v. State, 658 S.E.2d 773, 775 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)).
352 Presley, 674 S.E.2d at 911.
353 Presley, 78 U.S.L.W. at 4051.
354 Judges may have legitimate reason to question a juror in private when, for example, the nature of the
case or comments by the juror indicate a highly sensitive personal matter, or the judge fears the bias of a
particular panel member might taint the rest of the jury pool if questioning of that juror continues in open
court. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 511–12 (1984) (observing that the jury selection
process may “give rise to a compelling interest of a prospective juror when interrogation touches on deeply
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The generic risk of jurors overhearing prejudicial remarks,
unsubstantiated by any specific threat or incident, is inherent
whenever members of the public are present during the selection of
jurors. If broad concerns of this sort were sufficient to override a
defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial, a court could exclude
355
the public from jury selection almost as a matter of course.

Furthermore, ordering a preemptive courtroom closure is hardly the least
restrictive means for dealing with the speculative risk of a tainted jury pool—
even if the goal is to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial. If a trial court is
concerned that comments in the gallery will contaminate the jury panel, the
least restrictive response is to issue a clear admonition about proper conduct
during voir dire and to arrange the seating to minimize communicative
conduct.356 If those measures are not sufficient, a judge can always declare a
mistrial in the unlikely event that contaminating comments are made.
However, closing the courtroom preemptively, as occurred in Presley,
represents just the kind of generalized and unsupportable judicial conduct that
the Supreme Court has consistently forbidden, beginning with Richmond
Newspapers and extending through Waller.357
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented on the ground that Presley should not
have been disposed of summarily because the leading case addressing the
public trial right in the context of jury selection, Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court of California, dealt with the public’s First Amendment right to
attend jury selection, and so it remains an open question whether a defendant’s
personal matters” and that jurors may request an opportunity to present the problem to the judge in private, but
with counsel present and on the record). However, conducting private, personalized voir dire as a routine
matter would almost certainly run afoul of the principles condemned by the Supreme Court in Waller. Routine
private questioning of jurors without good cause appears similar to Michigan’s “one-man grand jury” system
struck down by the Supreme Court in In re Oliver. See discussion supra Part I.A.1 and accompanying notes.
355 Presley, 78 U.S.L.W. at 4053. To support their analysis, the majority cited dissenting Georgia
Supreme Court Justices Carol W. Hunstein and Leah Ward Sears, who explained: “[T]he majority’s reasoning
permits the closure of voir dire in every criminal case . . . whenever the trial judge decides, for whatever
reason, that he or she would prefer to fill the courtroom with potential jurors rather than spectators.” Id.
(quoting Presley, 674 S.E.2d at 913 (Sears, C.J., dissenting)).
356 Id. (“Trial courts are obligated to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at
criminal trials. . . . [S]ome possibilities include reserving one or more rows for the public; dividing the jury
venire panel to reduce courtroom congestion; or instructing prospective jurors not to engage or interact with
audience members.”).
357 See supra note 160 and accompanying text. Justices Sears and Hunstein expressed this same view in
their Presley dissent: “The majority today gives the trial courts in these cases the green light to exclude the
public entirely from voir dire in all of them, contrary to the express commands of the Sixth Amendment, the
Georgia Constitution, Waller, and Lumpkin.” Presley, 674 S.E.2d at 913–14 (Sears, C.J., dissenting)
(referencing R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 292 S.E.2d 815 (Ga. 1982)).
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Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to voir dire. In short, Justices
Scalia and Thomas disagreed with the majority’s conclusion “by
implication . . . that jury voir dire is part of the ‘public trial’ that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees.”358 However, in light of the extensive Supreme Court
jurisprudence articulating the sanctity of the public trial guarantee under both
the First and Sixth Amendments, this is not an issue that seemed to trouble the
seven-member majority. As stated in the per curiam opinion, while “[t]he
extent to which the First and Sixth Amendment public trial rights are
coextensive is an open question,” whether the Sixth Amendment right extends
to jury voir dire is “so well settled . . . that this Court may proceed by summary
disposition.”359 As the majority explained, “The public has a right to be
present [during voir dire] whether or not any party has asserted the right.”360
The Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Presley was deeply flawed, but
perhaps nowhere more so than its holding that the burden to propose
alternatives to closure rests on the party opposing closure, not on the trial
court.361 A majority of Georgia justices claimed that Waller did not “provide
clear guidance” on this question,362 but seven U.S. Supreme Court Justices
sharply disagreed:
[T]he Supreme Court of Georgia concluded, despite our explicit
statements to the contrary, that trial courts need not consider
alternatives to closure absent an opposing party’s proffer of some
alternatives. While the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded this
was an open question under this Court’s precedents, the statement in
Waller that “the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to
363
closing the proceeding,” settles the point.

The Presley dissenters disagreed, citing Ayala v. Speckard, a Second
Circuit case holding that the burden of proposing alternatives falls on the party
opposing closure.364 But even in announcing their dissent, Justice Scalia and
358

Presley, 78 U.S.L.W. at 4053 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 4052 (per curiam).
360 Id.
361 Presley, 674 S.E.2d at 911–12. In Presley, the trial judge acted abruptly, sua sponte, when she
banished the public from the courtroom. Id. at 912 (Sears, C.J., dissenting).
362 Id. at 911 (majority opinion).
363 Presley, 78 U.S.L.W. at 4052 (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984)).
364 Presley, 78 U.S.L.W. at 4054 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 70–72
(2d Cir. 1997) (en banc)). In Ayala, the court concluded:
359

Whether or not a sua sponte obligation exists to consider alternatives to complete closure, we see
nothing in the First Amendment cases or in Waller to indicate that once a trial judge has
determined that limited closure is warranted as an alternative to complete closure, the judge must
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Justice Thomas conceded that “the language [of both Waller and PressEnterprise] can easily be read to imply” that “the trial court must suggest such
alternatives in the absence of a proffer.”365
Presley was a routine drug trafficking case, unlike Craven, Anderson,
Priola, and Clements, which each involved child victims of criminal sexual
misconduct. If these latter cases illustrate how appellate courts are willing to
employ harmless error analysis, use post hoc findings, ignore the rule of plain
error, or invoke the statutory cover of the benefit-of-the-victim doctrine to
justify upholding the conviction of an “obviously guilty” defendant accused of
perpetrating a heinous crime upon a child, then Presley stands for the
inclination of some jurists—hopefully rare—to summarily disregard the
blackletter law of Waller altogether. After all, the trial judge freely admitted
her penchant for excluding family members of defendants and others during
voir dire.366 Although the evidentiary obstacles may be too difficult to
surmount, it remains to be seen whether the convictions of other defendants
who have stood trial in this judge’s courtroom are likely to be reversed in light
of Presley.
CONCLUSION
In the twenty-five years since Waller v. Georgia was decided, the Supreme
Court has never cast doubt on the four-part test it set forth to ensure the
constitutionality of courtroom closures. Nor has the Court questioned its
longstanding rule that harmless error never applies to violations of the public
trial right. In fact, even as the list of constitutional errors subject to harmless
sua sponte consider further alternatives to the alternative deemed appropriate. At that point, it
becomes the obligation of the party objecting to the trial court’s proposal to urge consideration of
any further alternatives that might avoid the need for even a limited closure.
Ayala, 131 F.3d at 71. The New York Court of Appeals announced an identical holding in People v. Ramos,
685 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1997), a companion case to Ayala in which the propriety of courtroom closure during
undercover police officer testimony was challenged unsuccessfully by the defendants. In Ramos, the court
held:
[T]he question as to who is responsible for enumerating desirable alternatives to closure was not
before the Waller Court. Squarely faced with that question now, we conclude that, where the
factual record permits closure and the closure is not facially overbroad, the party opposed to
closing the proceeding must alert the court to any alternative procedures that allegedly would
equally preserve the interest.
Ramos, 685 N.E.2d at 500 (citation omitted).
365 Presley, 78 U.S.L.W. at 4054 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
366 See supra note 350 and accompanying text.

LEVITAS GALLEYSFINAL

546

6/9/2010 2:49 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

error analysis grew, the Court reiterated that violations of the public trial right
could never be classified as harmless. A similar pattern is evident in the
application of plain error review. Even as the Court moved certain violations
of fundamental rights out from under the umbrella of protection afforded by
plain error review, the test the Court established for applying plain error
became considerably more sympathetic to the public trial right because it
emphasized the fairness and integrity of a criminal proceeding.
In light of the clarity of the four-part test laid down in Waller, the
consistency with which the Supreme Court has referred to violations of Waller
as structural error, and the straightforward applicability of the plain error rule,
violations of the public trial right should be exceedingly difficult to defend.
Curiously, this does not appear to be the case in the lower courts. Appellate
courts persist in sterilizing violations of the public trial right by holding such
errors “harmless;” manufacturing consent to avoid application of the plain
error rule; permitting post hoc findings to rationalize improper closures;
claiming that a state statutory scheme is a valid substitute for a careful, caseby-case inquiry; and asserting that only a substantial—not an overriding—
interest is needed to justify a “partial closure,” or that partial closure negates
the need to comply with Waller altogether. While these shortcomings are the
exception, not the rule, violations of the public trial right, like those described
in this Comment, still occur far too often. These decisions thus “erode[] the
individual rights and liberties that are presumed to elevate our system of
justice[,] . . . . dilute[] the force of our laws and shrink[] the boundaries of the
sphere of individual autonomy.”367 They also send powerful signals that trial
courts below can continue to engage in improper courtroom closures.
However, as the Supreme Court has recently announced in Presley,

367 Edwards, supra note 5, at 1194–95 (punctuation omitted). See also Ayala, 131 F.3d at 82 (Parker, J.,
dissenting) (“It is galling to my sense of fairness that courtroom closure is such a routine practice in New York
buy-and-bust cases.”); John M. Leventhal, Public Trial: Keeping the Undercover “Undercover”, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 3, 1992, at col. 1 (“Although the courts [of New York] formally reject a per se exception for an
undercover witness, a showing of almost any factor will justify closure.”).
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there is no question that trial courts must rigorously follow the requirements
laid down in Waller, and when they fail to do so, appellate courts must have
the courage to reverse.
DANIEL LEVITAS∗

∗ Executive Managing Editor, Emory Law Journal; J.D. Candidate, Emory University School of Law
(2010). I am especially grateful to Professor Kay Levine, my faculty advisor, for her guidance and insightful
feedback on numerous drafts. I would also like to thank my indefatigable colleagues on the Emory Law
Journal Executive Board, Amanda Burns, Erin East, and Deepthy Kishore, as well as Managing Editor
William W. Gill.

